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The large accumulation of public debt which took place as a consequence
of the recent financial crisis, poses the question of how governments are going to
reduce their debts. In this dissertation I look at prior episodes where most advanced
economies were highly indebted to understand the possible courses of action that
may be available to governments in the future.
Chapter 1, written with Carmen M. Reinhart, documents the role played by fi-
nancial repression and inflation in reducing government debt after the end of World
War II. This mechanism represents a more subtle and gradual form of debt re-
structuring. Evidence on the evolution and distribution of several measures of real
interest rates show that during the period 1945-1980 interest rates were markedly
more negative than what they were both in the period before World War II and
after 1980. When looking at the real interest rate on the portfolio of domestic debt,
real interest rates were negative half of the time for the 12 countries in the sample.
A negative real interest rate on the portfolio of domestic debt represents a saving
on interest payments for the government. In this case, savings on interest payments
averaged 2 to 3 percent of GDP. The chapter also documents the series of defaults,
restructurings and conversions that took place after the end World War I and the
Great Depression.
Chapter 2 builds on the results of the first chapter. It provides a conceptual
framework to understand the different ways through which inflation can affect the
value of government debt, and also how to think of financial repression as a restruc-
turing mechanism. Several econometric exercises are performed to disentangle the
relative contribution of financial repression and unanticipated inflation. The results
point to financial repression combined with inflation (i.e., a nonmarket interest rate
combined with inflation) as a relatively more important factor explaining the debt
reduction in the post-World War II period. Finally, the question of how investors
were affected during this period is explored. It is shown that the equity premium
almost doubled during this period. This result suggests that the presence of finan-
cial repression, during the period 1945-1980, could help explain to some extent the
equity premium puzzle.
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As a result of the recent financial crisis, the public debt-to-GDP ratios of most
advanced economies have reached historically high levels. A similar phenomena was
observed after the end of World War I and the Great Depression, and again after
the end of World War II.1 What is novel about this episode is that the debt ratios
of the private sector (both household and corporate) are also at historically high
levels. As of the end of 2009, the total debt-to-GDP ratio of Japan stood at 477
percent, 466 percent in the UK, and almost 300 percent in the US.2
A high level of private indebtedness could worsen even further the public fi-
nances of several countries. In the past, private debts before a crisis have usually
become public debt afterwards. Reinhart (2012) points at the cases of Ireland were
public debt was around 25 percent of GDP in 2007 and has since then increased to
107 percent as of the end of 2011; and also to the case of the US where the federal
debt increased by 25 percentage points as a result of the transfer of the debts of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. An added element of concern is that there is increas-
ing evidence that high debt ratios can negatively affect real growth once they reach
a certain threshold (See for instance, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010; Checherita and
1For instance, the debt ratio for advanced economies, calculated as a simple average of the
debt-to-GDP ratios of 19 advanced countries, reached 79 percent in 1922, 73 percent in 1932, 100
percent in 1946, and 70 percent in 2009.




Rother, 2010; Kuman and Woo, 2010), making it less likely that countries will be
able to grow their way out of debt (at least in the short term).
Revisiting similar episodes in the past can be useful for understanding the
possible courses of action currently available to governments. This dissertation looks
at how governments have reduced high debt burdens in the past, with particular
emphasis to the post-World War II period. World War I and Great Depressions debts
were reduced primarily via default, restructurings and conversions. There were also
some cases of hyperinflation such as Germany and Hungary. Following World War
II there were some defaults on external debt (i.e., Italy and Japan) but the majority
of the debts -which were denominated in local currency- were reduced through a
combination of financial repression and inflation. This mechanism represents a more
subtle and gradual form of debt restructuring or taxation.
The term "financial repression" is used to refer to a situation characterized by:
i) numerous policies and regulations which introduce frictions in financial markets,
and ii) large participation of nonmarket players. The policies that will be partic-
ularly relevant are those which create captive investors for government debt, and
hence allow the government to issue debt at a rate below what the market would
charge absent any restrictions. Being able to issue debt at a below market interest
rate represents a saving in interest payments for the government. When combined
with an inflation rate above the nominal interest rate, this leads to negative real
interest rates that effectively reduce government debt. An important observation is
that this mechanism does not require unanticipated inflation in order to be effective.
The main database was constructed from primary sources, and replicates the
2
domestic debt portfolios of 12 countries. These portfolios include detailed infor-
mation on each security outstanding every year, and covers for most countries the
period 1945-1980. The countries in the sample are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium,
France, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and
the United States.These countries exhibit different levels of economic development,
different degrees of involvement in World War II, different inflationary and debt
histories. The diversity across countries is important to understand how general the
results are.
Real interest rates were significantly lower during the financial repression pe-
riod (1945-1980) than both in the periods before and after. This is true regardless
of the measure of interest rate that is used (whether central bank discount, treasury
bills, deposit, or lending rates and whether for advanced or emerging markets). For
the advanced economies, real ex-post interest rates were negative in about half of the
years of the financial repression era compared with less than 15 percent of the time
since the early 1980s. When looking at the portfolio of domestic debt, real interest
rates were also negative half of the time between 1945-1980. This high incidence of
negative real interest rates implied large savings for the government, which averaged
between 2 to 3 percent of GDP per year.
The dissertation is structured in two chapters. Chapter 2 starts by document-
ing the large incidence of defaults following the World War I and Great Depression.
Evidence on the evolution and distribution of several different measures of real in-
terest rates for advanced and emerging economies is also provided. The chapter also
documents the importance of financial repression as a restructuring mechanism for
3
government debt after World War II. It contains first pass estimates which show
that the effects are quantitatively important. Chapter 3 complements the results
of the previous chapter in three important ways. First, it presents a conceptual
framework which is useful to understand the different channels through which infla-
tion can reduce government debt, and also how to think of financial repression as
a restructuring mechanism. Second, through different empirical exercises, it shows
that financial repression in combination with inflation is the most important channel
through which debt was reduced. Finally, the paper looks at the key features of this
period of financial repression and how the returns of other assets were affected. The
main finding of that section is that the abnormally low return on government bonds
is also reflected in the equity premium, which almost doubled in the US during the
period 1945-1980.
Since the beginning of the 1980s the world has moved toward a more liber-
alized environment, which raises the question of how relevant the findings of this
dissertation may be to explain the debt reduction that will need to take place in
the future. However, since the outbreak of the crisis there have been several regula-
tory changes which resemble those in place during the period 1945-1980 (Reinhart,
Kirkeegard, and Sbrancia; 2011). An element to keep in mind is that many of the
policies in place during the post-World War II period were not designed to reduce
government debt. On the contrary, they were designed to preserve and guarantee
the stability of the financial system (i.e., ceilings on deposit rates). There were




The Liquidation of Government Debt (with Carmen M. Reinhart)
2.1 Introduction
Some people will think the 23
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nonmarketable bond is a trick issue. We
want to meet that head on. It is. It is an attempt to lock up as much
as possible of these longer-term issues.
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury William McChesney Martin Jr. 1
The decade that preceded the outbreak of the subprime crisis in the summer
of 2007 produced a record surge in private debt in many advanced economies, in-
cluding the United States. The period prior to the 2001 burst of the "tech bubble"
was associated with a marked rise in the leverage of nonfinancial corporate business;
in the years 2001-2007, debts of the financial industry and households reached un-
precedented heights.2 The decade following the crisis may yet mark a record surge
in public debt during peacetime, at least for the advanced economies. It is not
surprising that debt reduction, of one form or another, is a topic that is receiving
1FOMCminutes, March 1âĂŞ2, 1951, remarks on the 1951 conversion of short-term marketable
US Treasury debts for 29-year nonmarketable bonds. Martin subsequently became chairman of
the Board of Governors, 1951âĂŞ70.
2The surge in private debt is manifest in both the gross external debt figures of the private
sector (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2010, for careful and extensive historical documentation since
1970 and Reinhart http://www.carmenreinhart.com/ for a splicing of their data with the latest
IMF/World Bank figures) and domestic bank credit (as documented in Reinhart, 2010). Relative
to GDP, these debt measures reached unprecented heights during 2007-2010 in many advanced
economies.
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substantial attention in academic and policy circles alike.3
Throughout history, debt/GDP ratios have been reduced by (i) economic
growth; (ii) substantive fiscal adjustment/austerity plans; (iii) explicit default or
restructuring of private and/or public debt; (iv) a sudden surprise burst in inflation;
and (v) a steady dosage of financial repression that is accompanied by an equally
steady dosage of inflation. (Financial repression is defined in Box 1) It is critical
to clarify that options (iv) and (v) are viable only for domestic-currency debts.
Since these debt-reduction channels are not necessarily mutually exclusive, histori-
cal episodes of debt-reduction have owed to a combination of more than one of these
channels.4
Hoping that substantial public and private debt overhangs are resolved by
growth may be uplifting, but it is not particularly practical from a policy stand-
point. The evidence, at any rate, is not particularly encouraging, as high levels
of public debt appear to be associated with lower growth. 5 The effectiveness of
fiscal adjustment/austerity in reducing debt -and particularly, their growth conse-
quences (which are the subject of some considerable debate)- is beyond the scope
of this paper. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009 and 2011) analyze the incidence of ex-
plicit default or debt restructuring (or forcible debt conversions) among advanced
3Among recent studies, see for example, Alesina and Ardagna (2009), IMF (2010), Lilico,
Holmes and Sameen (2009) on debt reduction via fiscal adjustment and Sturzenegger and Zettle-
meyer (2006), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein on debt reduction through
default and restructuring.
4For instance, in analyzing external debt reduction episodes in emerging markets, Reinhart,
Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) suggest that default and debt/restructuring played a leading role
in most of the episodes they identify. However, in numerous cases the debt restructurings (often
under the umbrella of IMF programs) were accompanied by debt repayments associated with some
degree of fiscal adjustment.
5See Checherita and Rother (2010), Kumar and Woo (2010), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2010).
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economies (through and including World War II episodes) and emerging markets as
well as hyperinflation as debt reduction mechanisms.
The aim of this paper is to document the more subtle and gradual form of debt
restructuring or "taxation" that has occurred via financial repression (as defined in
Box 1). We show that such repression helped reduce lofty mountains of public debt
in many of the advanced economies in the decades following World War II and
subsequently in emerging markets, where financial liberalization is of more recent
vintage.6 We find that financial repression in combination with inflation played an
important role in reducing debts. Inflation need not take market participants en-
tirely by surprise and, in effect, it need not be very high (by historic standards). In
effect, financial repression via controlled interest rates, directed credit, and persis-
tent, positive inflation rates is still an effective way of reducing domestic government
debts in the world’s second largest economy–China.7
Prior to the 2007 crisis, it was deemed unlikely that advanced economies could
experience financial meltdowns of a severity to match those of the pre-World War II
era; the prospect of a sovereign default in wealthy economies was similarly unthink-
able.8 Repeating that pattern, the ongoing discussion of how public debts have
6In a recent paper, Aizenman and Marion (2010) stress the important role played by inflation
in reducing U.S. World War II debts and develop a framework to highlight how the government
may be tempted to follow that route in the near future. However, the critical role played by
financial repression (regulation) in keeping nominal interest rates low and producing negative real
interest rates was not part of their analysis.
7Bai et. al. (1999), for example, present a framework that provides a general rationale for
financial repression as an implicit taxation of savings. They argue that when effective income-
tax rates are very uneven, as common in developing countries, raising some government revenue
through mild financial repression can be more efficient than collecting income tax only.
8The literature and public discussion surrounding "the great moderation" attests to this benign
view of the state of the macroeconomy in the advanced economies. See, for example, McConnell
and Perez-Quiros (2000).
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been reduced in the past has focused on the role played by fiscal adjustment. It
thus appears that it has also been collectively "forgotten" that the widespread sys-
tem of financial repression that prevailed for several decades (1945-1980s) worldwide
played an instrumental role in reducing or "liquidating" the massive stocks of debt
accumulated during World War II in many of the advanced countries, United States
inclusive.9 We document this phenomenon.
The next section discusses how previous "debt-overhang" episodes have been
resolved since 1900. There is a brief sketch of the numerous defaults, restructurings,
conversions (forcible and "voluntary") that dealt with the debts of World War I
and the Great Depression. This narrative, which follows Reinhart and Rogoff (2009
and 2011), primarily serves to highlight the substantially different route taken after
World War II to deal with the legacy of high war debts. Section III provides a short
description of the types of financial sector policies that facilitated the liquidation
of public debt. Hence, our analysis focuses importantly on regulations affecting
interest rates (with the explicit intent on keeping these low) and on policies creating
"captive" domestic audiences that would hold public debts (in part achieved through
capital controls, directed lending, and an enhanced role for nomarketable public
debts).
We also focus on the evolution of real interest rates during the era of financial
repression (1945-1980s). We show that real interest rates were significantly lower
during 1945-1980 than in the freer capital markets before World War II and after fi-
9For the political economy of this point see the analysis presented in Alesina, Grilli, and
Milesi Ferretti (1993). They present a framework and stylized evidence to support that strong
governments coupled with weak central banks may impose capital controls so as to enable them to
raise more seigniorage and keep interest rates artificially low-facilitating domestic debt reduction.
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nancial liberalization. This is the case irrespective of the interest rate used–whether
central bank discount, treasury bills, deposit, or lending rates and whether for ad-
vanced or emerging markets. For the advanced economies, real ex-post interest rates
were negative in about half of the years of the financial repression era compared with
less than 15 percent of the time since the early 1980s.
In Section IV, we provide a basic conceptual framework for calculating the "fi-
nancial repression tax," or more specifically, the annual "liquidation rate" of govern-
ment debt. Alternative measures are also discussed. These exercises use a detailed
data base on a country’s public debt profile (coupon rates, maturities, composition,
etc.) from 1945 to 1980 constructed by Sbrancia (2011). This "synthetic" public
debt portfolio reflects the actual shares of debts across the different spectra of ma-
turities as well as the shares of marketable versus nonmarketable debt (the latter
involving both securitized debt as well as direct bank loans).
Section V presents the central findings of the paper, which are estimates of the
annual "liquidation tax" as well as the incidence of liquidation years for ten coun-
tries (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, India, Ireland, Italy, South Africa, Sweden,
the United Kingdom, and the United States). For the United States and the United
Kingdom, the annual liquidation of debt via negative real interest rates amounted
to 2 to 3 percent of GDP on average per year. Such annual deficit reduction quickly
accumulates (even without any compounding) to a 20-30 percent of GDP debt re-
duction in the course of a decade. For other countries that, recorded higher inflation
rates the liquidation effect was even larger. As to the incidence of liquidation years,
Argentina sets the record with negative real rates recorded in all years but one from
9
1945 to 1980.
Section VI examines the question of whether inflation rates were systematically
higher during periods of debt reduction in the context of a broader 28-country sample
that spans both the heyday of financial repression and the periods before and after.
We describe the algorithm used to identify the largest debt reduction episodes on
a country-by-country basis and, show that in 21 of the 28 countries inflation was
higher during the larger debt reduction periods.
Finally, we discuss some of the implications of our analysis for the current debt
overhang and highlight areas for further research. Two appendices to this paper: (i)
compare our methodology to other approaches in the literature that have been used
to measure the extent of financial repression or calculate the financial repression
tax; (ii) provide country-specific details on the behavior of real interest rates across
regimes; and (iii) describe the coverage and extensive sources for the data compiled
for this study.
Box 1: Financial Repression Defined
The pillars of "Financial repression"
The term financial repression was introduced in the literature by the works
of Edward Shaw (1973) and Ronald McKinnon (1973). Subsequently, the term
became a way of describing emerging market financial systems prior to the
widespread financial liberalization that began in the 1980 (see Agenor and Mon-
tiel, 2008, for an excellent discussion of the role of inflation and Giovannini
10
and de Melo, 1993 and Easterly, 1989 for country-specific estimates). However,
as we document in this paper, financial repression was also the norm for ad-
vanced economies during the post-World War II period and in varying degrees
up through the 1980s. We describe here some of its main features.
(i) Explicit or indirect caps or ceilings on interest rates, particularly
(but not exclusively) those on government debts. These interest rate ceilings
could be effected through various means including: (a) explicit government reg-
ulation (for instance, Regulation Q in the United States prohibited banks from
paying interest on demand deposits and capped interest rates on saving deposits);
(b) ceilings on banks’ lending rates, which were a direct subsidy to the govern-
ment in cases where it borrowed directly from the banks (via loans rather than
securitized debt); and (c) interest rate cap in the context of fixed coupon rate
nonmarketable debt or (d) maintained through central bank interest rate targets
(often at the directive of the Treasury or Ministry of Finance when central bank
independence was limited or nonexistent). Allan Meltzer’s (2003) monumental
history of the Federal Reserve (Volume I) documents the US experience in this
regard; Alex Cukierman’s (1992) classic on central bank independence provides
a broader international context.
(ii) Creation and maintenance of a captive domestic audience that
facilitated directed credit to the government. This was achieved through multi-
ple layers of regulations from very blunt to more subtle measures. (a) Capital
account restrictions and exchange controls orchestrated a "forced home bias" in
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the portfolio of financial institutions and individuals under the Bretton Woods
arrangements. (b) High reserve requirements (usually non-remunerated) as a
tax levy on banks (see Brock, 1989, for an insightful international comparison).
Among more subtle measures, (c) "prudential" regulatory measures requiring
that institutions (almost exclusively domestic ones) hold government debts in
their portfolios (pension funds have historically been a primary target). (d)
Transaction taxes on equities (see Campbell and Froot, 1994) also act to direct
investors toward government (and other) types of debt instruments. And (e)
prohibitions on gold transactions.
(iii) Other common measures associated with financial repression aside
from the ones discussed above are, (a) direct ownership (e.g., in China or India)
of banks or extensive management of banks and other financial institutions (e.g.,
in Japan) and (b) restricting entry into the financial industry and directing credit
to certain industries (see Beim and Calomiris, 2000).
2.2 Default, Restructuring and Conversions: Highlights from 1920s-
1950s
Peaks and troughs in public debt/GDP are seldom synchronized across many
countries’ historical paths. There are, however, a few historical episodes where global
(or nearly global) developments, be it a war or a severe financial and economic
crisis, produce a synchronized surge in public debt, such as the one recorded for
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advanced economies since 2008. Using the Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) database for
70 countries, Figure 2.1 provides central government debt/GDP for the advanced
and emerging economies subgroups since 1900. It is a simple arithmetic average
that does not assign weight according to country size.
2.2.1 Global debt surges and their resolution
An examination of these two series identifies a total of five peaks in world
indebtedness. Three episodes (World War I, World War II, and the Second Great
Contraction, 2008-present) are almost exclusively advanced economy debt peaks;
one is unique to emerging markets (1980s debt crisis followed by the transition
economies’ collapses); and the Great Depression of the 1930s is common to both
groups. World War I and Depression debts were importantly resolved by widespread
default and explicit restructurings or predominantly forcible conversions of domestic
and external debts in both the now-advanced economies, and the emerging markets.
Notorious hyperinflation in Germany, Hungary and other parts of Europe violently
liquidated domestic-currency debts. Table 2.1 and the associated discussion provide
a chronology of these debt resolution episodes. As Reinhart and Rogoff (2009 and
2011) document, debt reduction via default or restructuring has historically been
associated with substantial declines in output in the run-up to as well as during the
credit event and in its immediate aftermath.
The World War II debt overhang was importantly liquidated via the combina-
tion of financial repression and inflation, as we shall document. This was possible
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because debts were predominantly domestic and denominated in domestic curren-
cies. The robust post-war growth also contributed importantly to debt reduction
in a way that was a marked contrast to the 1930s, when the combined effects of
deflation and output collapses worked to worsen the debt/GDP balance in the way
stressed by Irving Fisher (1933).
The resolution of the emerging market debt crisis involved a combination of
default or restructuring of external debts, explicit default, or financial repression
on domestic debt. In several episodes, notably in Latin America, hyperinflation in
the mid-to-late 1980s and early 1990s completed the job of significantly liquidating
(at least for a brief interlude) the remaining stock of domestic currency debt (even
when such debts were indexed, as was the case of Brazil).10
2.2.2 Default, restructurings and forcible conversions in the 1930s
Table 2.1 lists the known "domestic credit events" of the Depression. Default
on or restructuring of external debt (see the extensive notes to the table) also of-
ten accompanied the restructuring or default of the domestic debt. All the Allied
governments, with the exception of Finland, defaulted on (and remained in default
through 1939 and never repaid) their World War I debts to the United States as
economic conditions deteriorated worldwide during the 1930s.11
Thus, the high debts of World War I and the subsequent debts associated with
the Depression of the 1930s were resolved primarily through default and restructur-
10Backward-looking indexation schemes are not particularly effective in hyperinflationary con-
ditions.
11Finland, being under threat of Soviet invasion at the time, maintained payments on its debts
to the United States so as to maintain the best possible relationship.
14
ing. Neither economic growth nor inflation contributed much. In effect, for all 21
now-advanced economies, the median annual inflation rate for 1930-1939 was barely
above zero (0.4 percent).12 Real interest rates remained high through significant
stretches of the decade.
It is important to stress that during the period after World War I the gold
standard was still in place in many countries, which meant that monetary policy was
subordinated to keep a given gold parity. In those cases, inflation was not a policy
variable available to policymakers in the same way that it was after the adoption of
fiat currencies.
12See Reinhart and Reinhart (2010).
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Table 2.1: Episodes of Domestic Debt Conversions, Default or Restructuring,1920s-
1950s
Country Dates Commentary
Australia 1931/1932 The Debt Conversion Agreement Act in 1931/32 which
appears to have done something similar to the later NZ
induced conversion. See New Zealand entry.1
Bolivia 1927 Arrears of interest lasted until at least 1940.
Canada (Al-
berta)
April 1935 The only province to default - which lasted for about 10
years.
China 1932 First of several "consolidations", monthly cost of domes-
tic service was cut in half. Interest rates were reduced
to 6 percent (from over 9 percent)-amortization periods
were about doubled in length.
France 1932 Various redeemable bonds with coupons between 5 and 7
percent, converted into a 4.5 percent bond with maturity
in 75 years.
Greece 1932 Interest on domestic debt was reduced by 75 percent




Issuance of Littorio. There were 20.4 billion lire subject
to conversion, of which 15.2 billion were "Buoni Ordi-
nari" (short term securities).
Italy February 3rd,
1934
5 percent Littorio (see entry above) converted into 3.5
percent Redimibile
Mexico 1930s Service on external debt was suspended in 1928. Dur-
ing the 1930s, interest payments included "arrears of
expenditure and civil and military pensions."
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Table 2.1 – Continued from previous page
Country Dates Commentary
New Zealand 1933 In March 1933 the New Zealand Debt Conversion Act
was passed providing for voluntary conversion of internal
debt amounting to 113 million pounds to a basis of 4 per
cent for ordinary debt and 3 per cent for tax-free debt.
Holders had the option of dissenting but interest in the
dissented portion was made subject to an interest tax of
33.3 per cent.1
Peru 1931 After suspending service on external debt on May 29,
Peru made "partial interest payments" on domestic
debt.
Romania February 1933 Redemption of domestic and foreign debt is suspended
(except for three loans).
Spain October 1936-
April 1939
Interest payments on external debt were suspended, ar-
rears on domestic debt service.
United States 1933 Abrogation of the gold clause. In effect, the U.S. refused
to pay Panama the annuity in gold due to Panama ac-
cording to a 1903 treaty. The dispute was settled in 1936
when the US paid the agreed amount in gold balboas.
United King-
dom
1932 Most of the outstanding WWI debt was consolidated
into a 3.5 percent perpetual annuity. This domestic debt
conversion was apparently voluntary. However, some of
the WWI debts to the United States were issued under
domestic (UK) law (and therefore classified as domestic
debt) and these were defaulted on following the end of
the Hoover 1931 moratorium.
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Table 2.1 – Continued from previous page
Country Dates Commentary
Uruguay November 1, 1932
- February, 1937
After suspending redemption of external debt on Jan-
uary 20, redemptions on domestic debt were equally sus-
pended.
Austria December 1945 Restoration of schilling (150 limit per person). Remain-
der placed in blocked accounts. In December 1947, large
amounts of previously blocked schillings invalidated and
rendered worthless. Temporary blockage of 50 percent
of deposits.
Germany June 20, 1948 Monetary reform limiting 40 Deutschemark per person.
Partial cancellation and blocking of all accounts.
Japan March 2, 1946-
1952
After inflation, exchange of all bank notes for new is-
sue (1 to 1) limited to 100 yen per person. Remaining
balances were deposited in blocked accounts.
Russia 1947 The monetary reform subjected privately held currency
to a 90 percent reduction.
April 10 1957 Repudiation of domestic debt (about 253 billion rubles
at the time).
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and the authors.
1 See Schedvin (1970) and Prichard (1970), for accounts of the Australian and New Zealand
conversions, respectively, during the Depression. Michael Reddell kindly alerted us to these
episodes and references. Alex Pollock pointed out the relevance of widespread restrictions
on gold holdings in the United States and elsewhere during the financial repression era.
Notes: We have made significant further progress in sorting out the defaults on World War
I debts to the United States, notably by European countries. In all cases these episodes are
classified as a default on external debts. However, in some case âĂŞsuch as the UK–some of
the WWI debts to the US were also issued under the domestic law and, as such, would also
qualify as a domestic default. The external defaults on June 15, 1934 included: Austria,
Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland, United
Kingdom. Only Finland made payments. See New York Times, June 15, 1934.
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2.3 Financial Repression: policies and evidence from real interest rates
2.3.1 Selected financial regulation measures during the "era of financial
repression"
One salient characteristic of financial repression is its pervasive lack of trans-
parency. The reams of regulations applying to domestic and cross-border financial
transactions and directives cannot be summarized by a brief description. Table 2.2
makes this clear by providing a broad sense of the kinds of regulations on inter-
est rates and cross-border and foreign exchange transactions and how long these
lasted since the end of World War II in 1945. A common element across countries
"financial architecture" not brought out in Table 2.2 is that domestic government
debt played a dominant role in domestic institutions’ asset holdings–notably that
of pension funds. High reserve requirements, relative to the current practice in ad-
vanced economies and many emerging markets, were also a common way of taxing
the banks not captured in our minimalist description. The interested reader is re-
ferred to Brock (1989) and Agenor and Montiel (2008), who focus on the role of
reserve requirements and their link to inflation (see also Appendix Table B.2 and
accompanying discussion.)
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2.3.2 Real Interest Rates
One of the main goals of financial repression is to keep nominal interest rates
lower than would otherwise prevail. This effect, other things equal, reduces the
governments’ interest expenses for a given stock of debt and contributes to deficit
reduction. However, when financial repression produces negative real interest rates,
this also reduces or liquidates existing debts. It is a transfer from creditors (savers)
to borrowers (in the historical episode under study here–the government).
The financial repression tax has some interesting political-economy properties.
Unlike income, consumption, or sales taxes, the "repression" tax rate (or rates) are
determined by financial regulations and inflation performance that are opaque to
the highly politicized realm of fiscal measures. Given that deficit reduction usually
involves highly unpopular expenditure reductions and (or) tax increases of one form
or another, the relatively "stealthier" financial repression tax may be a more politi-
cally palatable alternative to authorities faced with the need to reduce outstanding
debts. As discussed in Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) and others, liberal capital- market
regulations (the accompanying market-determined interest rates) and international
capital mobility reached their heyday prior to World War I under the umbrella of
the gold standard. World War I and the suspension of convertibility and interna-
tional gold shipments it brought, and, more generally, a variety of restrictions on
cross-border transactions were the first blows to the globalization of capital. Global
capital markets recovered partially during the roaring twenties, but the Great De-
pression, followed by World War II, put the final nails in the coffin of laissez faire
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banking. It was in this environment that the Bretton Woods arrangement of fixed
exchange rates and tightly controlled domestic and international capital markets
was conceived.13 In that context, and taking into account the major economic dis-
locations, scarcities, etc. which prevailed at the closure of the second great war, we
witness a combination of very low nominal interest rates and inflationary spurts of
varying degrees across the advanced economies. The obvious result were real inter-
est rates -whether on treasury bills (Figure 2.2), central bank discount rates (Figure
2.3), deposits (Figure 2.4), or loans (not shown)- that were markedly negative during
1945-1946.
For the next 35 years or so, real interest rates in both advanced and emerging
economies would remain consistently lower than the eras of freer capital mobility
before and after the financial repression era. In effect, real interest rates (Figures
2.2-2.4) were on average negative.14 Binding interest rate ceilings on deposits (which
kept real ex post deposit rates even more negative than real ex-post rates on treasury
bills, as shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.4) "induced" domestic savers to hold government
bonds. What delayed the emergence of leakages in the search for higher yields
(apart from prevailing capital controls) was that the incidence of negative returns
on government bonds and on deposits was (more or less) a universal phenomenon
at this time.15 The frequency distributions of real rates for the period of financial
13In a framework where there are both tax collection costs and a large stock of domestic govern-
ment, Aizenman and Guidotti, (1994) show how a government can resort to capital controls (which
lower domestic interest rates relative to foreign interest rates) to reduce the costs of servicing the
domestic debt.
14Note that real interest rates were lower in a high-economic-growth period of 1945 to 1980
than in the lower growth period 1981-2009; this is exactly the opposite of the prediction of a basic
growth model and therefore indicative of significant impediments to financial trade
15A comparison of the return on government bonds to that of equity during this period and its
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repression (1945-1980) and the years following financial liberalization (roughly 1981-
2009 for the advanced economies) shown in the three panels of Figure 2.5, highlight
the universality of lower real interest rates prior to the 1980s and the high incidence
of negative real interest rates.
Such negative (or low) real interest rates were consistently and substantially
below the real rate of growth of GDP, this is consistent with the observation of
Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) when they state "An important factor behind the
dramatic drop (in US public debt) between 1945 and 1975 is that the growth rate of
GNP exceeded the interest rate on government debt for most of that period." They
fail to explain why this configuration should persist over three decades in so many
countries.
Real interest rates on deposits were negative in about 60 percent of the obser-
vations. In effect, real ex-post deposit rates were below one percent about 83 percent
of the time. Appendix Table B.1, which shows for each country average real interest
rates during the financial repression period (the dates vary, as highlighted in Table
B.1, depending on when interest rates were liberalized) and thereafter, substantiates
our claims that low and negative real interest rates (by historical standards) were
the norm across countries with very different levels of economic development.
The preceding analysis sets the general tone of what to expect, in terms of
real rates of return on a portfolio of government debt, during the era of financial
repression. For the United States, for example, Homer and Sylla (1963) describe
connection to "the equity premium puzzle" can be found in Sbrancia (2011).
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1946-1981 as the second (and longest) bear bond market in US history.16 To reit-
erate the point that the low real interest rates of the financial repression era were
exceptionally low in relation to not only the post-liberalization period but also the
more liberal financial environment of pre-World War II, Figure 2.6 plots the fre-
quency distribution of real interest rates on deposits for the United Kingdom over
three subperiods, 1880-1939,17 1945-1980, and 1981-2010.
The preceding analysis of real interest rates despite being qualitatively sugges-
tive falls short of providing estimates of the magnitude of the debt-servicing savings
and outright debt liquidation that accrued to governments during this extended pe-
riod. To fill in that gap the next section outlines the methodological approach we
follow to quantify the financial repression tax, while Section 5 presents the main
results.
2.4 The Liquidation of Government Debt: Conceptual and Data Issues
This section discusses the data and methodology we develop to arrive at esti-
mates of how much debt was liquidated via a combination of low nominal interest
rates and higher inflation rates, or what we term "the liquidation effect."18
Data requirements. Reliable estimates of the liquidation effect require con-
siderable data, most of which are not readily available from even the most com-
prehensive electronic databases. Indeed, most of the data used in these exercises
16They identify 1899-1920 as the first US bear bond market.
17Excluding the WWI period.
18Table B.2 and its accompanying discussion also examines other approaches to quantifying the
financial repression tax.
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come from a broad variety of historical government publications, many which are
quite obscure, as detailed in the Data Appendix. The calculation of the "liquidation
effect" is a clear illustration of a case where the devil lies in the details, as the struc-
ture of government debt varies enormously across countries and within countries
over time. Differences in coupon rates, maturity, distribution of marketable and
nonmarketable debt, and securitized debt versus loans from financial institutions
importantly shape the overall cost of debt financing for the government. There is
no "single" government interest rate (such as a 3-month T-bill or a 10-year bond)
that is appropriate to apply to a hybrid debt stock. The starting point to come up
with a measure that reflects the true cost of debt financing is a reconstruction of
the government’s debt profile over time.
Sample. We employ two samples in our empirical analysis. We use the
database from Sbrancia (2011) of the government’s debt profiles for 10 countries
(Argentina, Australia, Belgium, India, Ireland, Italy, South Africa, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, and the United States). These were constructed from primary
sources over the period 1945-1990 where possible or over shorter intervals (deter-
mined by data availability) for a subset of the sample. For the benchmark or basic
calculations (described below), this involves data on a detailed composition of debt,
including maturity, coupon rate, and outstanding amounts by instrument. For a
more comprehensive measure, which takes into account capital gains or losses of
holding government debt, bond price data are also required. In all cases, we also
use official estimates of consumer price inflation, which at various points in history
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may significantly understate the true inflation rates.19 Data on Nominal GDP and
government tax revenues are used to express the estimates of the liquidation effect
as ratios that are comparable across time and countries.
For our broader analysis of the behavior of inflation during major debt reduc-
tion episodes, which has far less demanding data requirements (domestic public debt
outstanding/GDP and inflation rates) our sample broadens to 28 countries from all
regions for 1790-2010 (or subsamples therein). The countries and their respective
coverage are listed in Appendix C.
2.4.1 Benchmark basic estimates of the "liquidation effect"
The debt portfolio. We construct a "synthetic portfolio"20 for the government’s
total debt stock at the beginning of the year (fiscal or calendar, as noted). This
portfolio reflects the actual shares of debts across the different spectra of maturities
as well as the shares of marketable versus nonmarketable debt.
Interest rate on the portfolio. The "aggregate" nominal interest rate for a
particular year is the coupon rate on a particular type of debt instrument weighted
by that instrument’s share in the total stock of debt.21 We then aggregate across
19This is primarily due to the existence of price controls which were mainly imposed during
WWII and remained for several years after the end of the conflict. See Friedman and Schwartz
(1982) for estimates of the actual price level in the US and UK, and Wiles (1952) for post-World
War II United Kingdom.
20The term "synthetic" is used in the sense that a hypothetical investor holds the total portfolio
of government debt at the beginning of the period, which is defined as either the beginning of the
calendar year or the fiscal year, depending on how the debt data is reported by the particular
country. Country specifics are detailed in the data appendix. The weights in this hypothetical
portfolio are given by the actual shares of each component of debt in the total domestic debt of
the government.
21Giovannini and de Melo (1993) state "the choice of a "representative" interest rate on domestic
liabilities an almost impossible task and because there are no reliable breakdowns of domestic and
foreign liabilities by type of loan and interest rate charged." This is precisely the almost impossible
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is calculated on an ex-post basis using CPI inflation for the corresponding
one-year period. It is a before-tax real rate of return (excluding capital gains or
losses).22
A definition of debt "liquidation years." Our benchmark calculations define
a liquidation year, as one in which the real rate of interest (as defined above) is
negative (below zero). This is a conservative definition of liquidation year; a more
comprehensive definition would include periods where the real interest rate on gov-
ernment debt was below a "market" real rate.23 It is possible that if the equilibrium
interest rate was negative, using this definition would be overestimating the actual
effect.
Savings to the government during liquidation years. This concept
captures the savings (in interest costs) to the government from having a negative real
interest rate on government debt. (As noted it is a lower bound on saving of interest
costs, if the benchmark used assumed, for example a positive real rate of, say, two or
three percent.) These savings can be thought of as having "a revenue-equivalent" for
the government, which like regular budgetary revenues can be expressed as a share
task we undertake here. Their alternative methodology is described in appendix Table B.2
22Some of the observations on inflation are sufficiently high to make the more familiar linear
version of the Fisher equation a poor approximation.
23However, determining what such a market rate would be in periods of pervasive financial
repression requires assumptions about whether real interest rates during that period would have
comparable to the real interest that prevailed in period when market were liberalized and prices
were market determined.
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of GDP or as a share of recorded tax revenues to provide standard measures of the
"liquidation effect" across countries and over time. The saving (or "revenue") to
the government or the "liquidation effect" or the "financial repression tax" is
the real (negative) interest rate times the "tax base," which is the stock of domestic
government debt outstanding.
2.4.2 An alternative measure of the liquidation effect based on total
returns
Thus far, our measure of the liquidation affect has been confined to savings
to the government by way of annual interest costs. However, capital losses (if bond
prices fall) may also contribute importantly to the calculus of debt liquidation over
time. This is the case because the market value of the debt will actually be lower than
its face value. The market value of government debt obviously matters for investors’
wealth but also measures the true capitalized value of future coupon and interest
payments. Moreover, a government (or its central bank) buying back existing debt
could directly and immediately lower the par value of existing obligations. Once
we take into account potential price changes, the total nominal return or holding
period return (HPR) for each instrument is given by:
HPRt =
(Pt − Pt−1) + Ct
Pt−1
(2.2)
where and are the prices of the bond at time and respectively, and is the annual
interest payment (i.e., the nominal coupon rate).
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We use this total return measure as a supplement rather than as our core or
benchmark "liquidation measure" (despite the fact that it incorporates more infor-
mation on the performance of the bond portfolio). 24 Bond price data are available
only for a subset of the securities that constitute the government portfolio and, more
generally, consistent time series price data are more difficult to get for some of the
countries in our sample. It is also worth noting that while price movements for
different bonds are generally in the same direction during a particular year, there
are significant differences in the magnitudes of the price changes. This cross-bond
variation in price performance makes it difficult to infer the price of nonmarketable
debt (for which there are no price data altogether), as well as marketable bonds
for which there is no price data. As before, we define "liquidation years" as those
periods in which the real return of the portfolio is negative.
2.4.3 The role of inflation and currency depreciation
The idea of governments using inflation to liquidate debt is hardly a new one
since the widespread adoption of fiat currency, as discussed earlier. It is obvious that
for any given nominal interest rate a higher inflation rate reduces the real interest
rate on the debt, thus increasing the odds that real interest rates become negative
and the year is classified as a "liquidation year." Furthermore, it is also evident that
for any year that is classified as a liquidation year the higher the inflation rate (for
a given coupon rate) the higher the saving to the government.
24See for example, CalvoâĂŹs (1989) framework which highlights the role of inflation in debt
liquidation even in the presence of short-term debt.
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2.5 The Liquidation of Government Debt: Empirical Estimates
This section presents estimates of the "liquidation effect" for ten advanced
and emerging economies for most of the post-World War II period. Our main interest
lies in the period prior to the process of financial liberalization that took hold during
the 1980s-that is, the era of financial repression. However, as noted, this three-plus
decade-long stretch is by no means uniform. The decade immediately following
World War II was characterized by a very high public debt overhang-legacy of the
war, a higher incidence of inflation, and often multiple currency practices (with
huge black market exchange rate premiums) in many advanced economies.25 The
next decade (1960s) was the heyday of the Bretton Woods system with heavily
regulated domestic and foreign exchange markets and more stable inflation rates
in the advanced economies (as well as more moderate public debt levels). The
1970s was quite distinct from the prior decades, as leakages in financial regulations
proliferated, the fixed exchange rate arrangements under Bretton Woods among the
advanced economies broke down, and inflation began to resurface in the wake of
the global oil shock and accommodative monetary policies in the United States and
elsewhere. To this end, we also provide estimates of the liquidation of government
debt for relevant subperiods.
25See De Vries (1969), Horsefield (1969), Reinhart and Rogoff (2002).
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2.5.1 Incidence and magnitude of the "liquidation tax"
Table 2.3 provides information on a country-by-country basis for the period
under study; the incidence of debt liquidation years (as defined in the preceding
section); the listing of the liquidation years; the average (negative) real interest rate
during the liquidation years; and the minimum real interest rate recorded (and the
year in which that minimum was reached). Given its notorious high and chronic in-
flation history coupled with heavy-handed domestic financial regulation and capital
controls during 1944-1974, it is not surprising that Argentina tops the list. Almost
all the years (92 percent) were recorded as liquidation years, as the Argentine real
ex-post interest rates were negative in every single year during 1944-1980 except
for 1953 (a just deflationary year). For India, that share was 53 percent (slightly
more than one half of the 1949-1980 observations recorded negative real interest
rates). Before reaching the conclusion that this debt liquidation through financial
repression was predominantly an emerging market phenomenon, it is worth noting
that for the United Kingdom the share of liquidation years was about 58 percent
during 1945-1980. For the United States, the world’s financial center, half of the
years during that same period Treasury debt had negative real interest rates.
As to the magnitudes of the financial repression tax (Table 2.3), real inter-
est rates were most negative for Argentina (reaching a minimum of -72.3 percent in
1976). The share of domestic government debt in Argentina (and other Latin Amer-
ican countries) in total (domestic plus external) public debt was substantial during
1900-1950s; it is not surprising that in light of these real rates the domestic debt
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market all but disappeared and capital flight marched upwards (capital controls
notwithstanding). By the late 1970s Argentina and many other chronic inflation
countries were predominantly relying on external debt.26 Italian real interest rates
right after World War II were as negative as 28 percent (in 1947). For the Unites
States real rates were on average -7 percent during 1945-1947 (on average the US
had -3.5 percent real rates during the liquidation years).
There are two distinct patterns in the ten-country sample evident from an
inspection of the timing of the incidence and magnitude of the negative real rates.
The first of these is the cases where the negative real rates (financial repression
tax) were most pronounced in the years following World War II (as war debts were
importantly inflated away). This pattern is most evident in Australia, the United
Kingdom and the United States, although negative real rates re-emerge following
the breakdown of Bretton Woods in 1974-1975. Then there are the cases where
there is a more persistent or chronic reliance on financial repression throughout the
sample as a way of funding government deficits and/or eroding existing government
debts. The cases of Argentina and India in the emerging markets and Belgium and
Sweden in the advanced economies stand out in this regard.
The preceding analysis, as noted, adopts a very narrow, conservative calcula-
tion of both the incidence of the "liquidation effect" or the financial repression tax.
Much of the literature on growth, as well as standard calibration exercises involving
subjective rates of time preference assume benchmark real interest rates of three
percent per annum and even higher. Thus, a threshold that only examines periods
26See Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)’s forgotten history of domestic debt.
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where real interest rates were actually negative is bound to underestimate the inci-
dence of "abnormally low" real interest rates during the era of financial repression
(approximately taken to be 1945-1980). To assess the incidence of more broadly
defined low real interest rates, Table 3.3 presents for the 10 core countries the share
of years where real returns on a portfolio of government debt (as defined earlier)
were below zero (as in Table 2.3), one, two, and three percent, respectively. 27
In the era of financial repression that we examine here, real ex post interest
rates on government debt reached three percent in only two years in the United
States; in effect in nearly 60 percent of the years real interest rates were below one
percent. The incidence of "abnormally low" real interest rates is comparable for
the United Kingdom and Australia-both countries had sharp and relatively rapid
declines in public debt to GDP following World War II.28 Even in countries with
substantial economic and financial volatility during this period (including Ireland,
and Italy), real interest rates on government debt above three percent were relatively
rare (accounting for no more than 20 percent of the observations).
2.5.2 Estimates of the Liquidation Effect
Having documented the high incidence of "liquidation years" (even by conser-
vative estimates), we now calculate the magnitude of the savings to the government
(financial repression tax or liquidation effect). These estimates take "the tax rate"
27An alternative strategy would be to use a growth model to calibrate the relationship between
the real interest rate and output growth for the counterfactual of free markets. That, however,
would make the results model specific.
28"Abnormally low" by the historical standards which include periods of liberalized financial
markets before and after 1945-1980; see Homer and Sylla’s (2005) classic book for a comprehensive
and insightful history of interest rates.
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(the negative real interest rate) and multiply it by the "tax base" or the stock of
debt. Table 2.5 reports these estimates for each country.
The magnitudes are in all cases non-trivial, irrespective of whether we use the
benchmark measure that is exclusively based on interest rate (coupon yields) or
the alternative measure that includes capital gains (or losses) for the cases where
the bond price data is available. For the United States and the United Kingdom
the annual liquidation of debt via negative real interest rates amounted on average
to 2 and 3 percent of GDP a year. Obviously, annual deficit reduction of 2 to 3
percent of GDP quickly accumulates (even without any compounding) to a 20 to
30 percent of GDP debt reduction in the course of a decade. Interestingly (but
not entirely surprising), the average annual magnitude of the liquidation effect for
Argentina is about the same as that of the UK, despite the fact that the average real
interest rate averaged about -3.5 percent for the UK and -21 percent for Argentina
during liquidation years in the 1945-1980 repression era. Just as money holdings
secularly shrink during periods of high and chronic inflation, so does the domestic
debt market.29 Argentina’s "tax base" (domestic public debt) shrank steadily during
this period; at the end of World War II nearly all public debt was domestic and by
the early 1980s domestic debt accounted for less than 1
2
of total public debt. Without
the means to liquidate external debts, Argentina defaulted on its external obligations
in 1982.
Countries like Ireland, India, Sweden and South Africa that did not experience
a massive public debt build-up during World War II recorded more modest annual
29These issues are examined in Reinhart and Rogoff (2011).
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savings (but still substantive) during the heyday of financial repression.30
2.6 Inflation and Debt Reduction
We have argued that inflation is most effective in liquidating government debts
(or debts in general), when interest rates are not able to respond to the rise in infla-
tion and in inflation expectations.31 This disconnect between nominal interest rates
and inflation can occur if: (i) the setting is one where interest rates are either admin-
istered or predetermined (via financial repression, as described); (ii) all government
debts are fixed-rate and long maturities and the government has no new financing
needs (even if there is no financial repression the long maturities avoid rising interest
costs that would otherwise prevail if short maturity debts needed to be rolled over);
and (iii) all (or nearly all) debt is liquidated in one "surprise" inflation spike. Our
attention thus far has been confined to the first on that list, the financial repres-
sion environment. The second scenario, where governments only have long-term,
fixed-rate debt outstanding and have no new financing needs (deficits) remain to be
identified (however, we have a sense such episodes are relatively rare). This leaves
the third case where debts are swiftly liquidated via an inflation spike (or perhaps
more appropriately surge). To attempt to identify potential episodes of the latter,
we conduct a simple exercise.32
30It is important to note that while financial repression wound down in most of the advanced
economies in the sample by the mid 1980s, it has persisted in varying degrees in India through the
present (with its system of state-owned banks and widespread capital controls) and in Argentina
(except for the years of the "Convertibility Plan," April 1991-December 2001).
31That is, the coefficient in the Fisher equation is less than one.
32See Chapter 3, Section 4.4 for an exercise where inflation expectations are estimated.
34
The exercise begins by identifying debt-reduction episodes and then focusing
on the largest of these. Any decline in debt/GDP over a three year window classifies
as a debt-reduction episode. For this pool of debt-reduction episodes, we construct
their frequency distribution (for each country) and focus on the lower (ten percent)
tail of the distribution to identify the "largest" three-year debt reduction episodes.
This algorithm biases our selection of episodes toward the more sudden (or abrupt)
ones (even if these are later reversed) which might a priori be attributable to some
combination of a booming economy, a substantive fiscal austerity plan, or a burst
in inflation/liquidation, or explicit default or restructuring. A milder but steady
debt reduction process that lasts over many years would be identified as a series of
episodes-but if the decline in debt over any particular three-year window is modest
it may not be large enough to fall in the lower ten percent of all the observations.
This exercise helps flag episodes where inflation is likely to have played a signif-
icant role in public debt reduction but does not provide estimates of how much debt
was liquidated (as in the preceding analysis). Because we only require information
on domestic public debt/GDP and inflation, we expand our coverage to 28 countries
predominantly (but not exclusively) over 1900-2009. Thus, we are not exclusively
focusing on the period of financial repression but examining more broadly the role
of inflation and debt reduction in the countries’ histories. Table 8 lists the largest
debt reduction episodes by country, the last year of the 3-year episode is shown for
each country; the year that appears in italics represents the largest single-episode
of debt reduction. The next two columns of the table are devoted to the average
and median inflation performance during the debt reduction episodes listed in the
35
second column in comparison to the inflation performance (average and median) for
the full sample (the coverage, which varies by country, is shown in Table A.3). In 22
of 28 countries, inflation is significantly higher in the episodes of debt reduction than
for the full sample. In the extreme cases, it is the wholesale liquidation of domestic
debt, such as during the German hyperinflation of the early 1920s and the long-
lasting Brazilian and Argentine hyperinflations of the early 1990s. Even without
these extreme cases, the inflation differentials between the debt reduction episodes
and the full sample are suggestive of the use of inflation (intentionally or because it
became unmanageable) to reduce (or liquidate) government debts even in periods
outside the era of heavy financial repressions. The evidence is only suggestive of
this interpretation, as no explicit causal pattern is tested.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
The substantial tax on financial savings imposed by the financial repression
that characterized 1945-1980 was a major factor explaining the relatively rapid re-
duction of public debt in a number of the advanced economies. This fact has been
largely overlooked in the literature and discussion on debt reduction. The UK’s his-
tory offers a pertinent illustration. Following the Napoleonic Wars, the UK’s public
debt was a staggering 260 percent of GDP; it took over 40 years to bring it down to
about 100 percent (a massive reduction in an era of price stability and high capital
mobility anchored by the gold standard). Following World War II, the UK’s public
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debt ratio was reduced by a comparable amount in 20 years.33
The financial repression route taken at the creation of the Bretton Woods
system was facilitated by initial conditions after the war, which had left a legacy of
pervasive domestic and financial restrictions. Indeed, even before the outbreak of
World War II, the pendulum had begun to swing away from laissez-faire financial
markets toward heavier-handed regulation in response to the widespread financial
crises of 1929-1931. But one cannot help thinking that part of the design principle of
the Bretton Woods system was to make it easier to work down massive debt burdens.
The legacy of financial crisis made it easier to package those policies as prudential.
To deal with the current debt overhang, similar policies to those documented here
may re-emerge in the guise of prudential regulation rather than under the politically
incorrect label of financial repression. Moreover, the process where debts are being
"placed" at below market interest rates in pension funds and other more captive
domestic financial institutions is already under way in several countries in Europe.
There are many bankrupt (or nearly so) pension plans at the state level in the
United States that bear scrutiny (in addition to the substantive unfunded liabilities
at the federal level).
Markets for government bonds are increasingly populated by nonmarket play-
ers, notably central banks of the United States, Europe and many of the largest
emerging markets, calling into question what the information content of bond prices
33Peak debt/GDP was 260.6 in 1819 and 237.9 percent in 1947. Real GDP growth was about
the same during the two debt reduction periods (1819-1859) and (1947-1967), averaging about 2.5
percent per annum (the comparison is not exact as continuous GDP data begins in 1830). As such,
higher growth cannot obviously account for the by far faster debt reduction following World War
II.
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are relatively to their underlying risk profile. This decoupling between interest rates
and risk is a common feature of financially repressed systems. With public and
private external debts at record highs, many advanced economies are increasingly
looking inward for public debt placements. While to state that initial conditions on
the extent of global integration are vastly different at the outset of Bretton Woods
in 1946 and today is an understatement, the direction of regulatory changes have
many common features. The incentives to reduce the debt overhang are more com-
pelling today than about half a century ago. After World War II, the overhang
was limited to public debt (as the private sector had painfully deleveraged through
the 1930s and the war); at present, the debt overhang many advanced economies
face encompasses (in varying degrees) households, firms, financial institutions and
governments.
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Figure 2.1: Surges in Central Government Public Debts and their Resolution: Ad-
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Sources: Reinhart (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009 and 2011), sources cited
therein and the authors.
Notes: Listed in parentheses below each debt-surge episode are the main mech-
anisms for debt resolution besides fiscal austerity programs which were not imple-
mented in any discernible synchronous pattern across countries in any given episode.
Specific default/restructuring years by country are provided in the Reinhart-Rogoff
database and a richer level of detail for 1920s-1950s (including various conversions
are listed in Table 1). The "typical" forms of financial repression measures are
discussed in Box 1 and greater detail for the core countries are provided in Table 2.
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Figure 2.2: Average Ex-post Real Rate on Treasury Bills: Advanced Economies and


















 (3-year moving average)
Financial Repression Era
Sources: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, various
sources listed in the Data Appendix, and authors’ calculations.
Notes:The advanced economy aggregate comprises: Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden,
the United States, and the United Kingdom. The emerging market group consists
of: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
Philippines, South Africa, Turkey and Venezuela. The average is unweighted and
the country coverage is somewhat spotty prior for emerging markets to 1960
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Figure 2.3: Average Ex-post Real Discount Rate: Advanced Economies and Emerg-





















 (3-year moving average)
Financial Repression Era
Sources: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, various
sources listed in the Data Appendix, and authors’ calculations.
Notes:The advanced economy aggregate comprises: Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden,
the United States, and the United Kingdom. The emerging market group consists
of: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
Philippines, South Africa, Turkey and Venezuela. The average is unweighted and
the country coverage is somewhat spotty prior for emerging markets to 1960
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Figure 2.4: Average Ex-post Real Rate on Deposits: Advanced Economies and


















 (3-year moving average)
Financial Repression Era
Sources: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, various
sources listed in the Data Appendix, and authors’ calculations.
Notes:The advanced economy aggregate comprises: Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden,
the United States, and the United Kingdom. The emerging market group consists
of: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
Philippines, South Africa, Turkey and Venezuela. The average is unweighted and
the country coverage is somewhat spotty prior for emerging markets to 1960
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Figure 2.5: Real Interest Rates Frequency Distributions: Advanced Economies,
1945-2009
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Sources: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, various
sources listed in the Data Appendix, and authors’ calculations.
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Table 2.2: Selected Measures Associated with Financial Repression
Country Domestic Financial Regulation Cap. Account - Exchange Restrictions
Argentina 1977-82, 1987, and 1991-2001, Ini-
tial liberalization in 1977 was re-
versed in 1982. Alfonsin govern-
ment undertook steps to deregulate
the financial sector in October 1987,
some interest rates being freed at
that time. The Convertibility Plan
-March 1991-2001, subsequently re-
versed.
1977-82 and 1991-2001. Between 1976
and 1978 multiple rate system was uni-
fied, foreign loans were permitted at
market exchange rates, and all forex
transactions were permitted up to US$
20,000 by September 1978. Controls
on inflows and outflows loosened over
1977-82. Liberalization measures were
reversed in 1982. Capital and exchange
controls eliminated in 1991 and rein-
stated on December 2001.
Australia 1980, Deposit rate controls lifted in
1980. Most loan rate ceilings abol-
ished in 1985. A deposit subsidy
program for savings banks started in
1986 and ended in 1987.
1983, capital and exchange controls
tightened in the late 1970’s, after the
move to indirect monetary policy in-
creased capital inflows. Capital account
liberalized in 1983.
45
Table 2.2 – Continued from previous page
Country Domestic Financial Regulation Cap. Account - Exchange Restrictions
Brazil 1976-79 and 1989 onwards, interest
rate ceilings removed in 1976, but
reimposed in 1979. Deposit rates
fully liberalized in 1989. Some loan
rates freed in 1988. Priority sec-
tors continue to borrow at subsidized
rates. Separate regulation on inter-
est rate ceilings exists for the micro-
finance sector
1984, System of comprehensive foreign
exchange controls abolished in 1984. In
the 1980’s most controls restricted out-
flows. In the 1990’s controls on inflows
were strengthened and those on out-
flows loosened and (once again) in 2010.
Canada 1967, with the revision of the Bank
Act in 1967, interest rates ceilings
were abolished. Further liberalizing
measures were adopted in 1980 (al-
lowing foreign banks entry into the
Canadian market) and 1986.
1970, mostly liberal regime.
Chile 1974 but deepens after 1984, com-
mercial bank rates liberalized in
1974. Some controls reimposed in
1982. Deposit rates fully market de-
termined since 1985. Most loan rates
are market determined since 1984.
1979, capital controls gradually eased
since 1979. Foreign portfolio and di-
rect investment is subject to a one year
minimum holding period. During the
1990s, foreign borrowing is subject to a
30% reserve requirement.
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Country Domestic Financial Regulation Cap. Account - Exchange Restrictions
Colombia 1980, most deposit rates at com-
mercial banks are market determined
since 1980; all after 1990. Loan rates
at commercial banks are market de-
termined since the mid-70’s. Re-
maining controls lifted by 1994 in all
but a few sectors. Some usury ceil-
ings remain.
1991, capital transactions liberalized in
1991. Exchange controls were also re-
duced. Large capital inflows in the
early 90’s led to the reimposition of re-
serve requirements on foreign loans in
1993.
Egypt 1991, interest rates liberalized.
Heavy "moral suasion" on banks
remains.
1991, Decontrol and unification of the
foreign exchange system. Portfolio
and direct investment controls partially
lifted in the 90’s.
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Country Domestic Financial Regulation Cap. Account - Exchange Restrictions
Finland 1982, gradual liberalization 1982-91.
Average lending rate permitted to
fluctuate within limits around the
Bank of Finland base rate or the av-
erage deposit rate in 1986. Later in
the year regulations on lending rates
abolished. In 1987, credit guide-
lines discontinued, the Bank of Fin-
land began open market operations
in bank CD’s and HELIBOR market
rates were introduced. In 1988, float-
ing rates allowed on all loans.
1982.Gradual liberalization 1982-91.
Foreign banks allowed to establish sub-
sidiaries in 1982. In 1984, domestic
banks allowed to lend abroad and in-
vest in foreign securities. In 1987, re-
strictions on long-term foreign borrow-
ing on corporations lifted. In 1989, re-
maining regulations on foreign currency
loans were abolished, except for house-
holds. Short-term capital movements
liberalized in 1991. In the same year,
households were allowed to raise foreign
currency denominated loans.
France 1984, interest rates (except on sub-
sidized loans) freed in 1984. Sub-
sidized loans now available to all
banks, are subject to uniform inter-
est ceiling.
1986, in the wake of the dollar crisis
controls on in/outflows tightened. The
extensive control system established by
1974, remains in place to early 80’s.
Some restrictions lifted in 1983-85. In-
flows were largely liberalized over 1986-
88. Liberalization completed in 1990.
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Germany 1980, interest rates freely market de-
termined from the 70’s to today. In
the year indicated, further liberaliza-
tions were undertaken.
1974. Mostly liberal regime in the late
60’s, Germany experiments with con-
trols between 1970-73. Starting 1974,
controls gradually lifted, and largely
eliminated by 1981.
India 1992. Complex system of regulated
interest rates simplified in 1992. In-
terest rate controls on D’s and com-
mercial paper eliminated in 1993 and
the gold market is liberalized. The
minimum lending rate on credit over
200,000 Rs eliminated in 1994. In-
terest rates on term deposits of over
two years liberalized in 1995.
1991. Regulations on portfolio and di-
rect investment flows eased in 1991.
The exchange rate was unified in
1993/94. Outflows remained restricted,
and controls remained on private off-
shore borrowing.
Italy 1983. Maximum rates on deposits
and minimum rates on loans set
by Italian Banker’s Association un-
til 1974. Floor prices on government
bonds eliminated in 1992.
1985. Continuous operation of ex-
change controls in the 70’s. Fragile BoP
delays opening in early 80’s. Start-
ing in 1985, restrictions are gradually
lifted. All remaining foreign exchange
and capital controls eliminated by May
1990.
49
Table 2.2 – Continued from previous page
Country Domestic Financial Regulation Cap. Account - Exchange Restrictions
Japan 1979. Interest rate deregulation
started in 1979. Gradual decontrol
of rates as money markets grow and
deepen after 85. Interest rates on
most fixed-term deposits eliminates
by 1993. Non time deposits rates
freed in 1994. Lending rates mar-
ket determined in the 90’s (though
they started in 1979, both exter-
nal and domestic liberalizations were
very gradual and cautious).
1979. Controls on inflows eased after
1979. Controls on outflows eased in
the mid-80s. Forex restrictions eased in
1980. Remaining restrictions on cross
border transactions removed in 1995.
Korea 1991. Liberalizing measures adopted
in the early 80’s aimed at privati-
zation and greater managerial lee-
way to commercial banks. Signif-
icant interest rate liberalization in
four phases. Significant interest rate
liberalization in four phases in the
90’s: 1991, 1993-94 and 1997. Most
interest rate deregulated by 1995, ex-
cept demand deposits and govern-
ment supported lending.
1991. Current account gradually liber-
alized between 1985-87, and article VIII
accepted in 1988. Capital account grad-
ually liberalized, starting in 1991, usu-
ally following domestic liberalization.
Restrictions on FDI and portfolio in-
vestment loosened in the early 90’s. Be-
ginning with outflows, inflows to secu-
rity markets allowed cautiously only in
the mid 90’s. Complete liberalization
planned for 2000.
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Malaysia 1978-1985 and 1987 onwards. Ini-
tially liberalized in 1978. Controls
were reimposed in the mid-80’s (es-
pecially 1985-87) and abandoned in
1991.
1987. Measures for freer in/outflows of
funds taken in 1973. Further ease of
controls in 1987. Some capital controls
reimposed in 1994. Liberalization of the
capital account was more modest, and
followed that of the current account.
Mexico 1977, deepens after 1988.Time de-
posits with flexible interest rates
below a ceiling permitted in 1977.
Deposit rates liberalized in 1988-
89. Loan rates have been liberalized
since 1988-89 except at development
banks.
1985. Historically exchange regime
much less restrictive than trade regime.
Further gradual easing between mid-
1985 to 1991. 1972 Law gave gov-
ernment discretion over the sectors in
which foreign direct investment was
permitted. Ambiguous restrictions on
fdi rationalized in 1989. Portfolio flows
were further decontrolled in 1989.
New
Zealand
1984. Interest rate ceilings removed
in 1976 and reimposed in 1981. All
interest rate controls removed in the
summer of 1984.
1984. All controls on inward and out-
ward Forex transactions removed in
1984. Controls on outward investment
lifted in 1984. Restrictions on foreign
companies’ access to domestic financial
markets removed in 1984.
51
Table 2.2 – Continued from previous page
Country Domestic Financial Regulation Cap. Account - Exchange Restrictions
Philippines 1981. Interest rate controls mostly
phased out between 1981-85. Some
controls reintroduced during the fi-
nancial crisis of 1981-87. Cartel-like
interest rate fixing remains preva-
lent.
1981. Foreign exchange and invest-
ment controlled by the government in
the 70’s. After the 1983 debt crisis the
peso was floated but with very limited
interbank forex trading. Off-floor trad-
ing introduced in 1992. Between 1992-
95 restrictions on all current and most
capital account transactions were elim-




1980. Interest rate controls re-
moved in 1980. South Africa Reserve
Bank relies entirely on indirect in-
struments. Primary, Secondary and
Interbank markets active and highly
developed. Stock Exchange modern
with high volume of transactions.
1983. Partially liberalized regime. Ex-
change controls on non-residents abol-
ished in 1983. Limits still apply on pur-
chases of forex for capital and current
transactions by residents. Inward in-
vestment unrestricted, outward is sub-
ject to approval if outside Common
Monetary Area. Several types of finan-
cial transactions subject to approval for
monitoring and prudential purposes.
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Sweden 1980. Gradual liberalization in the
early 80’s. Ceilings on deposit rates
abolished in 1978. In 1980, controls
on lending rates for insurance compa-
nies were removed, as well as a tax on
bank issues of certificate of deposits.
Ceilings on bank loan rates were re-
moved in 1985.
1980. Gradual liberalization between
1980-90. Foreigners allowed to hold
Swedish shares in 1980. Forex controls
on stock transactions relaxed in 1986-
88, and residents allowed to buy for-
eign shares in 1988-89. In 1989 foreign-
ers were allowed to buy interest bear-
ing assets and remaining forex controls
were removed. Foreign banks were al-
lowed subsidiaries in 1986, and opera-
tion through branch offices in 1990.
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Thailand 1989. Removal of ceilings on in-
terest rates begins in 1989. Ceil-
ing on all time deposits abolished
by 1990. Ceilings on saving de-
posits rates lifted in 1992. Ceilings
on finance companies borrowing and
lending rates abolished in 1992.
1991. Liberalized capital movements
and exchange restrictions in successive
waves between 1982-92. Article VIII
accepted and current account liberal-
ization in 1990, capital account liber-
alization starting in 1991. Aggressive
policy to attract inflows, but outflows
freed more gradually. Restrictions on
export of capital remain. The reserve
requirement on short-term foreign bor-
rowing in 7%. Currency controls intro-
duced in May-June 1997. These con-
trols restricted foreign access to baht in
domestic markets and from the sale of
Thai equities. Thailand relaxed limits
on foreign ownership of domestic finan-
cial institutions in October of 1997.
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Turkey 1980-82 and 1987 onwards. Liberal-
ization initiated in 1980 but reversed
by 1982. Interest rates partially
deregulated again in 1987, when
banks were allowed to fix rates sub-
ject to ceilings determined by the
Central Bank. Ceilings were later re-
moved and deposit rates effectively
deregulated. Gold market liberalized
in 1993.
1989. Partial external liberalization in
the early 80’s, when restrictions on in-
flows and outflows are maintained ex-
cept for a limited set of agents whose
transactions are still subject to con-
trols. Restrictions on capital move-
ments finally lifted after August 1989.
United
Kingdom
1981. The gold market, closed in
early World War II, reopened only in
1954. The Bank of England stopped
publishing the Minimum Lending
Rate in 1981. In 1986, the govern-
ment withdrew its guidance on mort-
gage lending.
1979. July 79: all restrictions on
outward FDI abolished, and outward
portfolio investment liberalized. Oct
1979: Exchange Control Act of 1947
suspended, and all remaining barriers
to inward and outward flows of capital
removed.
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short term debt for nonmarketable
29-year bond. Regulation Q sus-
pended and S&Ls deregulated in
1982. In 1933, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt prohibits private hold-
ings of all gold coins, bullion, and
certificates. On December 31, 1974,
Americans are permitted to own
gold, other than just jewelry.
1974. In 1961 Americans are forbid-
den to own gold abroad as well as at
home. A broad array of controls were
abolished in 1974.
Venezuela 1991-94 and 1996 onwards. Interest
rate ceilings removed in 1991, reim-
posed in 1994, and removed again in
1996. Some interest rate ceilings ap-
ply only to institutions and individu-
als not regulated by banking author-
ities (including NGOs).
1989-94 and 1996 onwards. FDI regime
largely liberalized over 1989-90. Ex-
change controls on current and capi-
tal transactions imposed in 1994. The
system of comprehensive forex controls
was abandoned in April 1996. Controls
are reintroduced in 2003.
Sources: Reinhart and Reinhart (2011) and sources cited therein. See
also FOMC minutes, March 1-2, 1951 for US debt conversion particulars,
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m/template.rc/1.26.9055/ on current ceilings
and related practices applied to microfinance, and National Mining Association (2006) on
measures pertaining to gold.
Notes: Liberalization year(s) in italics.
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Table 2.3: Incidence and Magnitude of the Liquidation of Public Debt: Selected
Countries, 1945-1980













































































Notes: Share of liquidation years is defined as the number of years during which the
real interest rate on the portfolio is negative divided by the total number of years
as noted in column (2). The real interest rate is calculated as defined in equation (1).
1 No data available for 1964-1968
2 The average and minimum real interest rate during liquidation years were calculated
over the period 1945-1970 to exclude war years
3 In 1944, the negative real return was 82.3 percent and in 1945 it was 46.6 percent.
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Table 2.4: Incidence of Liquidation Years for Different Real Interest Rate Thresh-
olds: Selected Countries, 1945-1980
Country Period Share of Years with Real Interest Rate below:
0 percent 1 percent 2 percent 3 percent
Argentina 1942-1980 92.3 92.3 94.9 94.9
Australia 1945-1980 52.3 63.9 83.3 94.4
Belgium1 1945-1974 48.0 65.4 72 80
India 1949-1980 53.0 62.5 71.9 78.1
Ireland 1960-1990 65.4 74.2 77.4 80.6
Italy2 1946-1980 48.6 62.9 65.7 82.9
South Africa 1945-1980 47.2 61.1 77.8 97.2
Sweden 1945-1990 47.8 52.2 69.6 82.6
United Kingdom 1945-1980 58.3 72.2 86.1 97.2
United States 1945-1980 50.0 55.6 86.1 94.4
Notes: Share of liquidation years is defined as the number of years during which the
real interest rate on the portfolio is negative divided by the total number of years
as noted in column (2). The real interest rate is calculated as defined in equation (2.1).
1 No data available for 1964-1968
2 The average and minimum real interest rate during liquidation years were calculated
over the period 1945-1970 to exclude war years.
Table 2.5: Government Revenues (interest cost savings) from the "Liquidation Ef-
fect:" per year










Argentina 1942-1980 3.1 38.3 3.1 39
Australia 1945-1980 3.3 12.9 n.a. n.a.
Belgium 1945-1974 2.5 18.6 3.5 23.9
India 1949-1980 1.5 27.2 1.5 27.2
Ireland 1960-1990 1.8 7.9 n.a. n.a.
Italy 1946-1980 1.6 24.5 1.6 26.5
South Africa 1945-1980 1.3 8 n.a. n.a.
Sweden 1945-1990 0.8 4.4 1.3 4.4
United Kingdom 1945-1980 3.0 18.8 3.1 19.6
United States 1945-1980 2.3 13.4 2.7 15.9
Sources: See data appendix and sources cited therein and authors’ calculations.
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Table 2.6: Debt Liquidation through Financial Repression: Selected Countries,
1945-1955
Country
Public debt/GDP Annual average: 1946-1955
1945 1955 (actual) 1955 without "financial repression inflation
repression revenue"/GDP
savings" (est.)4
Australia 143.8 66.3 195.7 7.4 8.6
Belgium1 112.6 63.3 130.1 5.7 3.4
Italy2 66.9 38.1 120.2 13.3 9.6
Sweden 52 29.6 72.6 5.2 3.8
United Kingdom3 215.6 138.2 233.8 2.6 3.9
United States 116 66.2 143.8 5.6 4.1
1 The debt-to-GDP ratio corresponds to 1946
2 Italy was in default on its external debt 1940-1946
3 The savings from financial repression are a lower bound, as we use the "official" consumer
price index for this period in the calculations and inflation is estimated to have been substantially
higher than the official figure (see for example Friedman and Schwartz, 1982).
4 The simple cumulative annual savings without compounding.
Notes: The peaks in debt/GDP were: Italy 129.0 in 1943; United Kingdom 237.9 in 1947;
United States 121.3 in 1946. An alternative interpretation of the financial repression revenue
is simply as savings in interest service on the debt.
Sources: See data appendix B and sources cited therein and authors’ calculations; for
debt/GDP see Reinhart (2010) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b).
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Table 2.7: Inflation Performance during Major Domestic Public Debt Reduction
Episodes: 28 Countries, 1790-2009
Country
Major Debt Reduction Episodes* Full Sample
Dates Inflation Inflation




479.8 8.2 82.5 8.6
Australia 1948,1949 -1953 10.3 9.3 3.0 2.5
Belgium 1925-28, 1949 10.7 12.8 2.0 1.9
Brazil 1990-1992,1995-
1996
898.2 980.2 111.3 11.3
Canada 1948,1949 -1952 7.3 5.3 3.2 2.5
Chile 1993 -1997, 2004-
2007
7.7 6.1 17.7 5.5
Colombia 2008, 2009 8.5 6.3 12.6 10.8
Egypt 2008 12.0 8.6 11.7 9.9
Finland 1946-1949 34.5 24.9 10.4 3.9
France 1924, 1926-1927,
1938
11.1 12.6 6.4 2.7
Germany 1922, 1923 5555049529.6 1764.7 231460401.3 2.3
Greece 1925 -1927 23.7 12.8 8.0 5.1
India 1958, 1996, 2006 7.1 6.2 6.6 6.2
Ireland 1972, 1982, 1998 9.8 8.6 5.9 3.7
Italy 1945, 1946 -1948 106.7 44.3 10.6 2.6
Japan 1898, 1912 -1913 7.6 6.7 3.6 2.6
Korea 1986 2.5 2.5 6.3 4.6
Malaysia 1995 8.4 8.8 6.9 5.4
Mexico 1991, 1992, 1993 18.9 20.0 13.3 5.6
New Zealand 1935-1937, 1950-
1952
4.9 5.3 4.2 2.8
Phillipines 1998, 2007 -2008 7.2 7.7 7.7 6.2
South Africa 1935, 1952, 1981,
2001-2002
7.0 6.6 5.8 4.9
Sweden 1948, 1952, 1989,
2001 -2003, 2009
4.7 3.2 4.4 3.2
Thailand 1989-1990 4.4 4.6 4.8 3.8
Turkey 1943, 2006-2008 23.2 9.2 25.3 9.7
UK 1836, 1846, 1854,
1936, 1940, 1948-
1950,1951-1954




4.0 2.6 1.6 1.7
Venezuela 1989, 1997 -1998,
2006-2007
41.6 29.5 11.4 5.8
* Consists of the 10% largest reductions for each country.
Notes: shown in italics the year of the major reduction
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Chapter 3
Debt and Inflation during a Period of Financial Repression
3.1 Introduction
In many countries, the current ratio of government debt to GDP is at histor-
ically high levels. The 2008 financial crisis has created a situation where several
countries are at risk of defaulting on their debt, and many more are struggling with
the economic and political changes needed to reduce their debt to more sustain-
able levels. Broadly speaking, the different alternatives available to governments to
reduce their debt burdens are: (i) growth; (ii) fiscal adjustment (i.e., increases in
taxes and reductions in government spending); (iii) outright default or restructur-
ing; and (iv) inflation (via inflation surprises or a combination of financial repression
and inflation). While there is some empirical evidence on the consequences of de-
fault (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Sturzenegger and Zettlelmeyer, 2006; Borensztein
and Panizza, 2006) and on the potential for fiscal austerity/restructuring (Alesina
and Ardagna, 2010; Perotti, 2011), there is limited empirical evidence on whether
inflation can reduce the real value of debt.
Revisiting similar episodes in the past can be useful for understanding the
possible courses of action currently available to governments. In this paper, I explore
the relationship between inflation and debt in the years after the Second World War
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in 12 countries with very different economic characteristics.1 Many governments
had high debt levels at the end of the Second World War, which then declined over
the following decades. I construct a detailed database of government debt portfolios
spanning three or more decades for each country and analyze the role of inflation
in reducing real debt, examine the circumstances under which this occurs, and the
implications of this for both the government and investors. The primary focus of
the paper is to understand whether this is an empirically important phenomenon,
rather than the desirability or optimality of using inflation to erode the real value
of debt.
To understand the magnitude and nature of the effects, it is important to
identify the channels through which inflation can have an effect on debt. The pre-
vious literature on how inflation may reduce debt is largely theoretical, and focused
on the role of unanticipated inflation in reducing government debt. Several papers
have looked at the time inconsistency problem present when debt is denominated in
nominal terms, where governments may be tempted to use unanticipated inflation
to reduce the real value of their debt (Barro and Gordon, 1983; Grossman and Van
Huyck, 1984, 1985; Grossman, 1987, 1988). In this paper, I identify three channels
through which inflation can have an effect on debt: unanticipated inflation, infla-
tion in combination with financial repression, and via changes in the market value
of debt.
The term "financial repression" is used to refer to a situation characterized by:
1The countries in the sample are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, France, India, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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i) numerous policies and regulations which introduce frictions in financial markets,
and ii) large participation of nonmarket players. The list of policies is large; some
examples of financial repression are: ceilings on interest rates, directed lending, cap-
ital controls.2 The policies that will be particularly relevant for this paper are those
which create captive investors for government debt, and hence allow the government
to issue debt at a rate below what the market would charge absent any restrictions.
Being able to issue debt at a below market interest rate represents a saving in in-
terest payments for the government. When combined with an inflation rate above
the nominal interest rate, this leads to negative real interest rates that effectively
reduce government debt. This mechanism can be present even when inflation is fully
anticipated.
There are several channels through which inflation can affect debt: unantici-
pated inflation, financial repression combined with inflation, and via changes in the
market value of debt. I develop a conceptual framework in order to understand how
those channels can be measured separately and together. While it is not possible
to directly observe inflation expectations and quantify the effect of financial repres-
sion on market interest rates, I show that the net effects of these channels must be
large whenever real interest rates are negative; that is, when real interest payments
are negative (which can be thought of as a revenue for the government). My pri-
mary empirical strategy is to focus on years where this occurs, which are labeled
liquidation years.3
2For a more detailed definition, see Appendix ?? and Reinhart and Sbrancia (2011).
3By focusing on years with negative real interest rates, the estimates may be overestimating
the actual effect if for instance the "natural" interest rate in the economy was negative. On the
other hand, the estimates may be underestimating the actual effect whenever the "natural" interest
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On average, real interest rates on the overall portfolios of domestic government
debt were negative in half of the years in the sample.4 The predominant pattern that
emerges across countries is a high incidence of liquidation years in the period imme-
diately after the end of WWII, and again during the 1970s. In the United States,
50 percent of the years between 1945 and 1980 were liquidation years. Estimates
of the implicit revenues for the governments in the 12 countries, which are labeled
liquidation revenues, average between two and three percent of GDP in liquidation
years.5
I show that the effects are similar whether I measure debt at face value or
at market value, which suggests that changes in the market value of debt are not
responsible for these large effects. I conduct several exercises to disentangle the rel-
ative contributions of the other two channels, unanticipated inflation and financial
repression. First, I estimate inflation expectations to see whether inflation surprises
can account for the liquidation years. Across the 12 countries, only 15 percent of
liquidation years are ones where there is an inflation surprise. This suggests that,
for the period under consideration, financial repression (combined with inflation) is
important for explaining the high incidence of liquidation years. In a second ex-
ercise, I test whether the overall results are biased by bonds issued prior to 1945.
The thinking behind doing this is that, if the overall results are primarily due to
unanticipated inflation, then newly- issued bonds should reflect higher inflation ex-
rate is positive.
4Historically most of the domestic debt has been denominated in local currency. Notable
exceptions are Mexican Tesobonos in the 1980’s and Brazil dollar-denominated bonds a decade
after.
5These revenues estimates do not includes the revenues from seigniorage. A comparison to
seigniorage revenues is performed in section 3.4.
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pectations. For bonds issued after 1945, I find negative real interest rates were as
common as in the full sample of bonds. This failure of markets to respond provides
further evidence that there was financial repression during this period.
To put the magnitude of the liquidation revenues into perspective, I compare
them to inflation tax revenues.6 The liquidation effect revenues are consistently
larger than inflation tax revenues at the beginning of the sample period, when debt
levels were high. In some countries, such as the United Kingdom, the liquidation
effect revenues are larger than inflation tax revenues throughout the whole sample
period. This finding may help to explain why Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) find that
the debt stock was significantly larger than the money stock in many episodes of
high and hyperinflation, as the gains from inflating away debt may be larger than
inflation tax revenues during these periods.
I also gain a greater understanding of the role of inflation by examining the
cumulative effect of inflation on the stock of debt under plausible alternative infla-
tion paths. I find that these cumulative effects are large. For example, if annual
inflation rate had remained constant at two percent throughout the 1945-1980 pe-
riod, the debt-to-GDP ratio in 1980 would have been 40 percentage points higher
in the United States, 167 percentage points higher in the United Kingdom, and 81
percentage points higher in Australia.
An important finding of the paper is that inflation need not be particularly
high in order to obtain a sizable reduction of the debt. Except in Argentina and Italy,
6The term "inflation tax” refers to the component of seigniorage that would be collected in
steady state.
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median inflation during liquidation years is below 10 percent. Average inflation is
four percentage points higher than median inflation rates over the 1930-2010 period.
A multivariate analysis is conducted to understand how country characteris-
tics and different factors affect the incidence of the liquidation effect. I find that
two variables strongly and positively correlated with liquidation years are interest
payments (as a proportion of GDP) and the size of the deficit relative to GDP. The
significance of these fiscal variables points at the presence of important links be-
tween fiscal and monetary policies. I find that neither the share of short term debt
nor central bank independence have have strong relationships with the incidence of
liquidation years.
The last section of the paper focuses on the implication for investors. If Trea-
sury bonds are used as a benchmark in the valuation of other assets, then it is
important to understand how the presence of financial repression affected financial
markets more broadly.7 I examine returns on bonds and other financial assets for
more than 100 years, and find that the returns on bonds were low during the 1945-
1980 period relative to other periods. Furthermore, for all of the countries in the
sample the return from investing in stocks during the 1945-1980 period was much
higher than the return from investing in government bonds. These differences do
not appear to be explained by stock return volatility or risk. The equity premium
is shown to be relatively high during this period. For instance, the average equity
premium - calculated as the excess return of stocks on T-Bills over rolling 30-year
7For instance, Treasury bonds serve as a benchmark in the valuation of corporate bonds
(Crabbe and Fabbozi, 2002).
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periods - in the US averaged 8.3 percent over 1945-1980, compared to an equity
premium of 4.4 percent in the other years between 1870 and 2010. These patterns
are consistent with the presence of financial repression keeping returns on bonds
artificially low over the 1945-1980 period.
The paper contributes to several literatures. First, it extends the results of
Reinhart and Sbrancia (2011) who establish the importance of financial repression
as a restructuring mechanism for government debt. In their paper, the authors
provide first pass estimates which show that the effects are quantitatively important.
This paper complements the results of Reinhart and Sbrancia (2011) in three main
ways. First, I examine the different channels through which inflation can reduce
government debt and consider how to think of financial repression as a restructuring
mechanism. Second, through different empirical exercises, I show that financial
repression in combination with inflation is the most important channel through
which debt was reduced. Finally, the paper looks at the key features of this period
of financial repression and how the returns of other assets were affected.
A related literature looks at the implications of inflation on a government’s re-
ported fiscal position, and particularly how inflation affects measures of fiscal deficit
(Siegel,1979; Tanzi et al., 1987; Persson et al.,1996). The results in this paper
provide empirical support for the theoretical literature which has argued that gov-
ernment debt could not be reduced systematically by unanticipated inflation (Calvo
and Guidotti, 1993). The results also point to financial repression as an important
source of revenue, which could be important for rationalizing why countries seem
to set inflation rates above what would be optimal if they were just maximizing
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seigniorage revenues (Calvo and Leiderman, 1992).
The paper also adds to the literature on financial repression, which has pri-
marily focused on the economic growth implications in emerging economies (Mc
Kinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; King and Levine, 1993; Fry, 1997). I show that finan-
cial repression can be important in advanced economies, and may generate revenues
for governments by reducing their debt burdens.8 This complements work by Gio-
vannini and de Melo (1991), who measure the revenues from financial repression
by comparing the interest paid by the government on its external and domestic
debt, and Aizenman and Guidotti’s (1990) theoretical work analyzing under what
conditions it may be optimal to impose capital controls.
Finally, the paper contributes to growing efforts to use historical documents
and government reports to understand key issues in international finance. Long time
series on public debt were uncommon until the publication of Reinhart and Rogoff
(2008, 2009). I construct a database on the domestic debt portfolios of 12 countries
for three or more decades after the end of WWII. The database contains a detailed
description of the different instruments that constitute the stock of debt in a given
year together with their coupon rates, maturity date, outstanding amount and in
some cases prices at different points in time.
The next section presents the conceptual framework. Section 3.3 describes the
data and the empirical measures constructed. In Section 3.4, I present the results
for the liquidation effect from the perspective of the government. In Section 3.5,
8For evidence on the presence of financial repression in these countries, please see the Appendix
?? in this paper and Reinhart and Sbrancia (2011).
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a broader analysis of financial markets during the period of financial repression is
provided, together with its implications for investors. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
The first step is to understand the channels through which inflation can affect
the value of debt. When discussing how debts may be "inflated away," researchers
usually think of a higher than expected inflation rate eroding the real value of the
debt. However, financial repression (by which governments issue debt at below mar-
ket interest rates) is an additional and important channel through which inflation
can reduce government debt. The primary objective of this section is to separate, at
least conceptually, the contribution of unanticipated inflation and financial repres-
sion in the liquidation of government debt.
The consolidated budget constraint for the government is obtained by com-
bining the budget constraints of the fiscal and monetary authorities. This budget
constraint makes explicit the tight linkage that exists between monetary and fiscal











On the left side are the expenditures in a given year: government spending
(gt) and the real interest payments on the real stock of debt, which depends on
the nominal interest rate set in the previous period (it−1 ), the inflation rate in the
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current period (πt), and the debt from the previous period (bt−1).9 The real interest
rate paid on the stock of debt issued in the previous period is an ex post real interest
rate, since it is determined by the realized rate of inflation. The right side contains
the sources of income: revenues (τt), newly issued real debt (bt), and the seigniorage
revenues from printing money, where ht is the real monetary base.10 While inflation
affects seigniorage revenues as well as other items of the budget constraint, I ignore
those effects as the focus on the paper is on sources of revenue which have a direct
impact on a government’s real debt payments.11 These effects are compared to
seigniorage revenues in Section 3.4.
The budget constraint can be re-written in terms of the ex post real interest
rate (rPt ) as follows:
gt + (1 + r
P







Two additional definitions of interest rates are required to capture the role of
unanticipated inflation and financial repression. The first one is the ex ante real
interest rate. This is the interest rate that is expected to be earned in period t, as
9Expressing the budget in terms of a one-period bond simplifies the notation without changing
the implications that would be derived from explicitly considering a richer maturity structure.
10Seigniorage is the change in the nominal monetary base relative to the previous period, and
divided by the current price level. It arises from two sources as shown below:
Ht −Ht−1
Pt




The first component of seigniorage comes from changes in the real stock of monetary base. The
second comes from a depreciation in the outstanding stock of real balances, and is sometimes
referred to as inflation tax. In steady state, only the second component will be positive.
11See Persson, Persson and Svensson (1996) for a study on the overall fiscal gains from an
increase in the inflation rate in Sweden.
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of period t− 1. It is determined by the nominal interest rate it−1 and the expected
inflation rate πet .
The second interest rate definition identifies the effect of financial repression.
The free market interest rate (iFt−1) is the interest rate that would be observed in
the absence of financial frictions. If the government issues debt at a below-market
interest rate, then iFt−1 > it−1.
The three relevant interest rates are:
1 + rPt =
1 + it−1
1 + πt
Ex post real interest rate (3.3)
1 + rAt =
1 + it−1
1 + πet
Ex ante real interest rate (3.4)
1 + rFt =
1 + iFt−1
1 + πet
Ex ante free market real interest rate (3.5)
These terms can be incorporated into the government budget constraint. After
some algebraic manipulations, the following equation is obtained:12
gt+(1+r
F



















The "unanticipated inflation effect" is the difference between realized and ex-
pected inflation multiplied by the real cost of previous period stock of debt, while
12The term, 1+it−1+4t−11+πet where 4t−1 = i
F
t−1− it−1, is added and subtracted from the left-hand
side of equation (3.1).
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the "financial repression effect" is the difference between the free market and actual
nominal interest rate multiplied by the real stock of debt from the previous period.
To better understand this equation, note that if there were no financial frictions
that would cause it−1 to be different from iFt−1, and if actual inflation was equal to
expected inflation, then the last two terms on the left side would be equal to zero.
In this case, (1 + rFt ) would be both the ex ante and ex post real interest rate,
and there would be no savings in interest payments for the government from either
source.
Whenever the actual inflation rate is above the expected inflation rate, the
unanticipated inflation effect will be positive and the government will save on interest
payments by the amount given by this term.13The opposite is true when expected
inflation is higher than the actual inflation rate. The financial repression effect will
be positive and represent savings for the government when the nominal interest rate
does not reflect the true cost of borrowing for the government, so that the actual
nominal interest rate is below the free market interest rate.
Both effects can be present at the same time. In this case, financial repression
has an indirect effect on the size of the unanticipated inflation effect. This indirect
effect comes from the fact that the ex ante real interest rate (rAt ) will be lower than





savings from unanticipated inflation will be lower in the presence of financial repres-
sion. This interaction is potentially important when modeling inflation expectations





and inflation surprises, although it will not be separately estimated in this paper.
The Consolidated Budget Constraint at Market Value
Up to this point debt has been expressed at face value. Expressing the consol-
idated budget constraint with debt at market value allows the identification of an
additional effect that comes from changes in the market value of debt. This will be
important for understanding returns for investors, and the response of the market in
the presence of the effects. In a well-functioning financial system, changes in infla-
tion expectations are going to affect expected returns and should be reflected in the


















Where PBt stands for the price of the debt at time t, and Bt is the nominal

























Note that this equation is similar to equation (3.1), apart from the extra term




is the rate of
change in the market value of debt.14 Following some algebraic manipulations, a
14Changes in the market price of debt affect only the principal and not the interest payment
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When using debt at market values it is possible to distinguish between three
effects: a valuation effect, the unanticipated inflation effect, and the financial repres-
sion effect. The unanticipated inflation and financial repression effects are identical
to the corresponding terms in equation (3.6), and can be interpreted in the same
way. The valuation effect has an easy interpretation: when the prices of the govern-
ment bonds go down there is an implicit capital gain for the government due to a
lower value of its liabilities. On the other hand, when prices are increasing there is
an implicit capital loss due to an increase in the value of the government liabilities.
This does not represent a change in the cash payments the government makes, but
a change in the market value of its debt.
Measurement Issues
Equation (3.6) identifies the different elements required to estimate the sources









(3.9) identifies the elements required to estimate the sources of interest payment
savings for the government at market value. A central challenge is that, in both
cases, it is not possible to directly observe inflation expectations and free market
interest rates.
The first approach to dealing with this is to focus on instances when the
net effect of inflation expectations and financial repression is so large that one or
both must be present. When real interest payments are negative, they constitute
a revenue rather than an expenditure for the government. In equation (3.2), when
debt is at face value, this will be the case when rPt < 0. In these years, the sum of
the unanticipated inflation effect and the financial repression effect is large enough
to outweigh the free market interest payments, which is given by the second term
on the left hand side of the equation. Given that government debt is liquidated in
any year where real interest payments are negative, those years will be defined as
liquidation years.15 I will refer to the effect of inflation on debt as the liquidation
effect and the revenues for the government from this source as liquidation revenues,
which will be calculated in any single year as:
Liquidation Revenues = Negative Real Interest Rate×
Outstanding Stock of Domestic Debt
15Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) refer to the use of inflation to erode the value of government
debts as default via inflation. I use the term "liquidation effect” to allow for the possibility that
the inflation was not caused by a deliberate government action.
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This definition provides a lower bound for the effect of inflation on debt, since
the combined effect of unanticipated inflation and financial repression needs to out-
weigh free market interest payments.16 It is possible however that the estimates
may be overestimating the actual effect. This would be the case for instance if the
"equilibrium interest rate" was negative. 17 There is also a possible source of mea-
surement error arising from the fact that financial repression may have had an effect
on the size of the debt stock (the tax base). The relevant question is what would
have been the size of the debt stock absent financial repression.
The measure captures the net effect of inflation expectations and financial
repression on domestic debt, when these are sufficiently large to satisfy the definition
(assuming a positive natural interest rate). In order to gain some understanding of
the relative contribution of each, inflation expectations are estimated. This is done
in Section 3.4 and provides a range for the contribution of inflation expectations.
By considering the remainder of the total effect as due to financial repression, this
approach also provides some understanding of the importance of financial repression.
Similar approaches are used when it comes measuring debt at market value. As




0. The only difference is the additional term that reflects changes in the market value
of government debt. This component turns out to be small, so that the face and
market value measures produce similar results. To the extent that the term reflects
changes in expectations for future inflation, this term provides additional informa-
16Additional assumptions are used in Section 3.4 to understand the likely frequency of instances
where these effects are positive but not large enough to satisfy the definition adopted here.
17Available estimates for the US and other countries show a positive and above 1% equilibrium
interest rate from 1960 (Laubach and Williams, 2003; Benati and Vitale, 2007).
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tion about the role of inflation expectations for the countries and periods under
study.18
3.3 Empirical Measures and Data
This section presents the empirical measures constructed to measure the effect
of inflation on government debt, and the data used to calculate those measures. De-
tailed information on the overall portfolio is necessary to obtain accurate estimates
because there is no single interest rate that is going to reflect the financing cost of
the government.
3.3.1 Empirical Measures
Two measures of nominal interest rates are constructed, one corresponding to
when debt is expressed at face value and the other when debt is at market value. The
face value measure is the Contractual Interest Rate (CIR), which is the coupon rate
at which the bond was issued. From the perspective of the government it represents
the annual interest cost of each security. The CIR is consistent with the accounting
method used by the government.
The market value measure is the Holding Period Return (HPR). The HPR is
the nominal return for a security bought at the beginning of a year and sold at the
18This term could also reflect changes in the general economic environment. Siegel (1979)
decomposes the changes in the real market value of debt coming from changes in the general price
level and changes in the price of government bonds. He finds that bond price changes are more
volatile but account for a small fraction of the total changes in the real market value of debt. An
additional point made by Siegel is that changes in the general environment will affect both the
liabilities and assets side of a government’s balance sheet, which may leave the wealth position of
the government largely unchanged.
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end, where a year corresponds to the fiscal year of each country.19 The HPR reflects
changes in the market interest rate and is the proper way to measure the (before








The Holding Period Return comes from two sources: the annual interest pay-
ments and any capital gains (losses) coming from increases (decreases) in the price
of the bond. Apart from minor differences in notation, this expression is the same
than the one obtained in the conceptual framework.
Both the CPR and HPR are nominal measures. Their real counterparts are
obtained using inflation data from each country’s Consumer Price Index and that
corresponds to the annual inflation rate during the fiscal year. Since the rate of






Where xit is the nominal return (either CIR, HPR) for security i at time t.
The last step consists of calculating the real interest rate for the whole portfolio
of government securities. This is done by calculating the weighted average of the real
interest rates of each security, where the weights represent the amount outstanding
19For the US data as of end of December is used, given that monthly data was available, due
to changes in the fiscal year during the sample period.
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of that security relative to the total outstanding of all securities. In the case of HPR
the total amount outstanding corresponds to the sum of the amounts outstanding
of the securities for which the measure was calculated. This is done, in order to
have the weights adding up to 1.







where Nt equals the total amount of securities at each point in time.
A liquidation year takes place whenever the real interest rate on the overall
portfolio is negative. This definition is a lower bound for the actual effect in the
case of the CIR measure since only cases where the combined effect of unanticipated
inflation and financial repression is large enough to make the real interest rate neg-
ative are considered. In the case of the HPR measure there exists the theoretical
possibility that it may be capturing changes in the general economic environment
and not the effects studied in this paper. As discussed in the previous section, em-
pirical evidence suggests this should account at most for a small fraction of the total
cases.
Finally, by saving in interest payments there is an implicit revenue for the
government in years of liquidation effect which can be calculated as:
Liquidation Revenues = Negative Real Interest Rate×Outstanding Stock of Domestic Debt
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3.3.2 Data
A database was constructed from primary sources and includes 12 advanced
and developing countries. The sources are usually publications by the fiscal authority
or the central bank of each country; they are listed in Appendix ?? . The stock of
domestic debt in each year consists of the full list of securities outstanding at the
end of that year. For each security, I collected data on the outstanding amount,
maturity date, and coupon rate. Additional information was collected, depending
on its availability, including the price at which the securities were issued, and the
share of marketable and non-marketable debt.
There are 12 countries in the sample: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, France,
India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United
States. The data on securities prices required to calculate the Holding Period Return
were available for Argentina, Belgium, India, Italy, Sweden, United Kingdom and
the United States. The sample period in each country generally covers 1945 to 1980.
The exceptions are India, which only has data after its independence in 1949, and
Belgium, and France, where data is unavailable for 11, and 8 years respectively.
Data is available for Ireland, Japan and Sweden that extends beyond 1980. 20Table
3.1 lists the sample periods covered for all 12 countries.
Nine of these countries are advanced economies; the three developing countries
are Argentina, India and South Africa. These countries had quite different economic
outcomes during the sample period. They also differ in the degree to which they
20More recent data is also available for other countries in the sample, but has not yet been
compiled.
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were involved in World War II, and the challenges they faced at the end of it. There
are also large differences in their debt over time. Table 3.1 also shows the change in
the debt-to-GDP ratio from 1945 to 1980 for each country. Many of these countries
experienced large reductions in their debt over this period. The UK has the largest
decline in the debt ratio, from 210 to 41 percentage points. In the United States,
the ratio decreased from 118 to 33 percentage points. While debt ratios generally
declined over time, there are several countries in which the debt ratio remained
fairly constant or even increased. The diversity of the types and experiences of
these countries will be important to understand how general the results are, as well
as, how they vary depending on the countries’ economic characteristics..
It is important that the database covers all of a country outstanding securities,
as the composition of debt varies over time. For example, in the United States,
Treasury Bills constituted 6.5 percent of the total domestic debt in 1946 and 25.1
percent of the total in 1976, while non-marketable securities accounted for 22.7
percent in 1946, 16.7 percent in 1966 and 35.4 percent in 1976. As another example,
the share of marketable rupee loans in India went from 59 percent in 1950 to 39
percent in 1970. The composition of the debt portfolio of India and the US at
different dates is shown in Table C.3 of Appendix ??.
3.4 The Liquidation Effect from the Perspective of the Government
In this section, I begin by describing the inflation in the 12 countries and real
interest rates on their debt portfolios over the sample period. The incidence and
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magnitude of the liquidation effect is then outlined, together with a description of
the associated revenues for the government.
Several additional exercises are presented, which are aimed at understanding
what mechanisms are driving the aggregate patterns. First, inflation expectations
are estimated to separate the relative contribution coming from unanticipated in-
flation and financial repression. Next, I focus on bonds issued within the sample
period in order to understand whether returns on new bond issues responded to
low real returns. This furthers our understanding of the role of financial repression
during this period, as poor returns on new bond issues suggests a captive audience
for those bonds. The magnitude of the revenues from the liquidation effect are then
put in perspective by comparing it to those from the inflation tax, and by looking
at the cumulative effect it had on the stock of debt. Finally, a multivariate analysis
is used to identify which country characteristics are particularly relevant to explain
the incidence of the liquidation effect.
3.4.1 Inflation and Real Interest Rates on Debt Portfolios
Before getting into an examination of the liquidation effect, it is important to
understand the inflation rates and the distribution of real interest rates during the
period under study. The first three columns of Table 3.2 shows several statistics for
the inflation rates in the different countries. The average inflation rate in nine of the
countries is in single digits during this period, while the median inflation is in single
digits in all of the countries except Argentina. In the United States the average
inflation rate was 4.6 percent and the median inflation rate was 3.2 percent, while in
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the United Kingdom the average inflation was 6.3 percent and median inflation 4.2
percent. High inflation rates in France, Italy, and Japan in the years immediately
after WWII declined significantly in the 1950s.
Table 3.2 also shows the arithmetic mean, the median and the standard de-
viation for the real interest rate on the debt of each country. Columns (4) to (6)
show the results when the Contractual Interest Rate is used, and columns (7) to (9)
show the results when the Holding Period Return is used to measure real returns.
When the CIR is used, the average real interest rate is negative in all countries
except Sweden. The real interest rate is negative in seven of the eight countries
where the HPR can be calculated, with Belgium the only exception. Median real
interest rates are also low: for example, using the CIR, six of the 12 countries have
a median real return that is negative and the median real return is never larger than
1.2 percent. Using the CIR, the median real interest rate was -0.6 percent in the
United Kingdom and 0.3 percent in the United States. In the whole sample, the
fraction of the observations where the real interest rate is above three percent is,
on average, 11 percent; it is 5.6 percent in the United States and 2.8 percent in the
United Kingdom.
Two countries have particularly poor real returns. Argentina has the largest
negative mean and median real interest rate: the median real interest was -14.1
according to CIR and -11.0 according to HPR. France has the next largest average
and median negative real interest rates, which may be explained by two main facts.
First, the missing years of 1953-1958 and 1960-1963 perhaps contributes to that
pattern. In most countries, the real interest rate is above the average and median
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values in those years. Second, even if France did not lose WWII, it had been
occupied by German forces during the War, which left the country and the economy
in a delicate situation. The average inflation rate was 40 percent between 1945 and
1950, while the (weighted) average interest rate on the debt was 2.7 percent during
the same period.
It is clear that the results that follow are not going to be driven by a small
number of years in each country. The incidence of negative real interest rates during
the period 1945-80 was consistently high across the countries, and the distributions
of real returns were skewed towards negative values.21
3.4.2 Incidence and Magnitude of the Liquidation Effect
Liquidation years are years where the real interest rate on the debt portfolio
is negative. Table 3.3 shows the incidence of liquidation years for each country
according to the CIR measure. Column (1) contains the share of liquidation years
for the full sample period of each country, and the following columns show the share
of liquidation years for different subperiods. The average share of liquidation years
is 56 percent for the full sample period. Excluding Argentina, which is an outlier in
the sample, it is 53 percent. Liquidation years comprise 50 percent of the years in
the United States and 58 percent of the years in the United Kingdom.
When looking at changes in the share of liquidation years across subperiods,
two patterns can be identified. The most common one is a high incidence of liquida-
21Reinhart and Sbrancia (2011) show the distributions of real deposit rates, discount rates and
T-Bill rates in a larger groups of advanced and emerging economies. In all cases the distributions
for the period 1945-1980 are to the left from those before 1945 and after 1980.
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tion years immediately after the end of WWII, a lower incidence between 1957-1968,
and a higher incidence again in the 1970s. This is the case for eight countries: Aus-
tralia, Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, South Africa, the UK and the US. In all of
these countries, there is a higher incidence during the period 1969-1980 than during
1945-1956. These are typically countries where the debt ratios were high at the end
of WWII. The low incidence period of 1957-1968 coincides with the golden era of
Bretton Woods, while the high incidence during the 1970s occurs at a time when a
surge in the price of commodities led to an increase in the inflation rates of most
countries.
The second pattern occurs in the case of Argentina, India, Ireland and Sweden,
who exhibit a reasonably constant incidence of liquidation years across the subpe-
riods. Argentina is the most extreme case, with almost every single year satisfying
the definition of liquidation year. In India, there is a lower incidence in the first
subperiod and the subsequent increase in the share of liquidation years in the other
two subperiods. While the debt ratio in India did not vary much during the period
under study, this is explained by the average inflation rate during 1949-1956 (0.2
percent) being significantly lower than in the other subperiods (6.6 percent during
1957-1968 and 7.0 percent during 1969-1980). In the case of Ireland, the lower share
of liquidation years during the 1980s can be attributed to a higher average nominal
interest rate and a lower inflation rate. In Sweden, the average inflation rate during
1969-1980 was 8.4 percent, twice as large the average inflation for the two previous
subperiods. This, combined with the fact that the nominal interest rate did not
increase by the same proportion, explains the higher incidence of liquidation years
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during 1969-1980 relative to 1945-1968.
An interesting observation is that the incidence of liquidation years diminishes
in the countries for which the sample period extends beyond 1980, when most of
the controls were lifted and the era financial liberalization began. In Ireland, the
incidence for 1969-1980 was 92 percent, whereas for 1981-1990 it was 30 percent.
It went from 83 percent to 10 percent over the same subperiods in Sweden, while
there is only one liquidation year in Japan after 1980. The period after 1980 is a
period of greater financial liberalization, and the reduced incidence of negative real
returns seems to be associated with higher nominal interest rates and lower inflation
rates. To illustrate, in Sweden the average nominal interest rate was 6.2 percent and
average inflation 8.4 percent during 1969-1980, whereas the average nominal interest
rate was 10.9 percent and average inflation 7.6 percent during 1981-1990. Even if
inflation did not go down by much on average the nominal interest rate increased
significantly.
Table 3.4 shows the magnitude of the liquidation effect in these liquidation
years. For any given year, the liquidation effect corresponds to the absolute value of
a negative real interest rate. Column (1) shows the average liquidation effect for the
full sample period, while the next five columns show the average liquidation effects
for the same subperiods as in Table 3. Excluding Argentina and Japan, which have
large average liquidation effects of 21.4 and 13.2 percent respectively, the average
liquidation rate was 4.6 percent. The subperiods results show a similar pattern
to that observed in the previous table, namely that liquidation rates were higher
both after WWII and during the 1970’s. Column (1) of the table shows the largest
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negative real interest rate for each country, together with the year in which it took
place. For roughly half of the countries, the minimum real interest rate took place
in the years immediately after the end of WWII, and for the other half it occurred
in the early 1970s. The minimum real interest rate in the United States was -13.7
percent in 1946, while in the UK the minimum was -10.9 percent in 1975.
3.4.3 Liquidation Revenues for the Government
The implicit revenues for the government are calculated as a percentage of
GDP and presented in Table 3.5. The way to interpret these estimates is that, if
the average liquidation revenues were two percent, it means that the government’s
deficit was, on average, two percentage points of GDP lower during liquidation years
and led to savings on interest payments equivalent to two percent of GDP. Revenues
are determined by the magnitude of the liquidation effect and the size of the stock
of debt.
The average liquidation effect revenues during the entire sample period gener-
ally lies between 1.5 and 3.8 percent of GDP, with Sweden (0.8 percent) and Japan
(5.9 percent) the only countries outside of this range. Table 5 also shows average
revenues within subperiods. Initially high debt-to-GDP ratios means revenues were
highest in the period immediately after WWII. In all countries, the average revenue
is higher for 1945-1956 than for the full sample period. In the United States, average
revenues relative to GDP were 4.3 percent during 1945-1956 and 2.3 percent for the
full period, with both the liquidation rate and the debt ratio highest in that first
subperiod. In the case of Australia, revenues during 1945-1956 (6.7 percent) were
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twice as high as the average for the full sample (3.3 percent).Debt-to-GDP ratios
were relatively low in India, Ireland, South Africa and Sweden, which is reflected in
lower average revenues. In India, where both the debt-to-GDP ratio and the liqui-
dation effect rate were constant over the full sample, the revenues were reasonably
constant across subperiods as well. Italy also exhibits relatively low revenues, the
large reduction in the debt ratio was between 1942-1947 which explains the high
value in the first subperiod.
It is helpful to also compare liquidation effect revenues to tax revenues in those
years. Table 3.6 presents a comparison of the liquidation revenues relative to both
GDP and tax revenues for the Holding Period Return measure as well as the CIR
measure. Tax revenues do not include those from the inflation tax. Results for
the CIR and HPR measures are similar, which suggests that the valuation effect
is generally small. The revenues from the liquidation effect can be sizable when
expressed in terms of tax revenues, as they average 20 percent of tax revenues. A
comparison to the revenues from the inflation tax is presented later in the section.
An important finding of this paper is that the inflation rate does not need to be
very high. Table 3.7 compares the median inflation rate -due to the presence of very
high inflation in some of the countries- during liquidation years and during 1930-
2010. The reason to start in 1930 is to focus on the period after the gold standard
when there was a change in the way monetary policy was conducted. Two thirds
of the countries in the sample have median inflation below 10 percent both during
liquidation years and during 1930-2010. The difference is as low as 1.8 percentage
points for South Africa. In the US, median inflation during liquidation years was
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6.0 percent, in contrast to 3.0 percent during 1930-2010. In the UK median inflation
was 8.3 percent, 4.5 percentage points higher than the historical median.
Higher inflation rates led in some cases to a faster liquidation of the debt,
whereas in other cases this did not happen. In Argentina, inflation rates were high
during most of the period (53.4 percent on average) but no large reduction in the
debt ratio is observed, possibly because the government kept running deficits which
forced it to keep borrowing. In contrast, Italy and Japan had very high inflation
(around 500 percent) at the end of WWII. This spike in inflation in Italy reduced
the debt ratio from 118 percent in 1942 to 21 percent in 1947.22 In the Japanese
case there is no good data for GDP during the war but different estimates put the
debt ratio over 110 percent, in 1951 the debt-to-GDP ratio had reached 10 percent.
In both cases the sample was started in 1946 after the end of WWII, in the Italian
case the spike in inflation was prior to that which is reflected in a lower incidence
and liquidation rate as well as revenues.23 If one were to include 1942-1945 to the
Italian sample the revenues numbers for the first subperiod would be very similar
to those of Japan.
3.4.4 The Role of Inflation Expectations and Financial Repression
The measures presented so far do not distinguish between the relative contri-
butions of inflation surprises and financial repression. The goal of this section is to
estimate inflation expectations, in orde to identify the relative contribution of each
22Average real growth was -4 percent between 1942 and 1947




The empirical strategy to estimate inflation expectations follows Fama (1975)
and Mishkin (1981), who were interested in testing for market efficiency. An advan-
tage of this method is that it allows standard errors to be obtained. The analysis
is centered on the Fisher equation, in which the nominal interest rate at time t is







Where it represents the nominal interest rate between t − 1 and t, rAt is the
real interest rate expected to be earned between t− 1 and t, and πet is the inflation
rate expected by the market between t− 1 and t.
Contrary to the ex ante real interest rate, which is determined by the expected
rate of inflation, the ex post real interest rate is determined by the actual inflation
between t− 1 and t:
24There are several ways in which inflation expectations have been estimated. One is to estimate
the anticipated component of inflation (or money supply) with an ARMA or ARIMA process and
take the residuals as the unanticipated component (Barro, 1978). Other techniques include using
a Kalman filter (Burmeister, Wall, and Hamilton, 1986) or indexed bond yields to recover the
inflation expectations (Deacon and Derry, 1994). The latter one is not a possible alternative in
this case because indexed bonds were issued after the end of the sample period. For example,
they were first introduced in the United Kingdom in 1981 and in the United States in 1997.
While there are surveys on inflation expectations, such as the Livingston Survey and the Thomson
Reuters/University of Michigan Survey in the United States, such surveys are not widely available
during this period.
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rPt = it − πt (3.14)
= rAt − (πt − πet ) (3.15)
Under the assumption of rational expectations in the bond market, the forecast
error of inflation should be uncorrelated with information available at t− 1, which
implies that:
E (πt − πet |φt−1) = 0 (3.16)
Where φt−1 denotes the information set at t − 1. That is, given all of the
available information at t−1, on average the difference between actual and expected
inflation is equal to zero.
Using variables Xt−1 that are part of the information set φt−1, the following
equation can be written:
rAt = Xt−1β + ut (3.17)
The error term ut is also determined at t− 1 and is assumed to have a mean
of zero, constant variance, and to be serially uncorrelated. Equation (3.17) can be
substituted into (3.14) to obtain:
rPt = Xt−1β + ut − εt (3.18)
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where εt = πet − πt.
Contrary to (3.17), equation (3.18) can be estimated. Mishkin shows that the
OLS estimate of β from (3.17) and (3.18) are equal in expectation. The variance-
covariance matrix derived from equation (3.18) will be larger than the one resulting
from (3.17), and the estimates of β from equation (3.18) will be less precise.
The variables included in Xt−1 are: inflation rate, money growth rate, real
GDP growth, and trend variables. These variables are the variables usually used in
this literature because of their high correlation with the ex ante real interest rate.
The estimates are used to obtain the following series for the ex-ante real interest
rate:
r̂At = Xt−1 ˆβrP (3.19)
Combining this with equation (3.13), estimates for inflation expectations can
be obtained:
π̂et = it − r̂At = it −Xt−1 ˆβrP (3.20)
The exact standard errors for the estimates cannot be obtained, as the variance
of the within-sample error depends on the relative size of the variance of ut and the
variance of εt. However, lower and upper bounds for the errors can be obtained.
I estimated this equation as follows. The first step was to run the regression
with one explanatory variable at a time, varying the number of lags of that variable
and selecting the lag structure with the highest adjusted R2. Of the regressions
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with the different explanatory variables, the regression with the highest adjusted
R2 was chosen. In the second step, a second variable was added to this regression
and the process repeated to choose the variable and lag structure that results in the
highest adjusted R2. This is done for the subsequent variables until adjusted R2
is maximized.25 This iterative process determined the regression to be estimated,
which was tested for serial correlation in the errors and for heteroscedasticity.
Table 3.8 contains the results of the regressions for each country when CIR
measures are used.26 The explanatory variables are denoted as follows: inflation
rate (INFL), growth of money supply (GM1), real growth in GDP (GROWTH),
and a trend variable (TREND). The estimated equation varies country by country,
reflecting different sets of variables that provided the best fit. All of the regres-
sions include lagged values of inflation and/or money growth; the first lag of both
measures is generally negative and statistically significant. Lagged values of growth
are included in several countries, although the magnitude of the coefficients is never
particularly large. These country-specific specifications generally explain around
half of the variation in inflation.
These regressions provide a basis on which to bound inflation expectations.27
When people form their expectations about future inflation, they are likely to have
a distribution for future inflation rather than a point estimate. For this reason, an
inflation surprise year is said to take place whenever the actual inflation rate is two
25Darrat (1985) applies a similar method to calculate inflation expectations but with an autore-
gressive process.
26Similar results are obtained using the HPR, when it is available.
27As a robustness exercise, inflation expectations were also estimated by fitting an autoregressive
process. This generates similar estimates of inflation expectations. Also, for the United States,
these estimates were found to be similar to the Livingston survey on inflation expectations.
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standard deviations above the estimated expected rate of inflation.
Table 3.9 shows the share of inflation surprises relative to the total number
of years in the sample for each country, as well as the overlap between inflation
surprises years and liquidation years. The results are presented using both the
lower and upper bound estimates for the standard errors. The average share of
inflation surprises each county has is 8 percent using upper bound standard errors
and 17 percent using the lower bound. The frequency of inflation surprise years in
liquidation years is 15 to 28 percent, depending on which estimate for the standard
errors is used. In either case, they constitute a minority of cases, which suggests
that inflation surprises are not the primary cause of liquidation years.
For most countries, inflation surprises are concentrated immediately after the
end of World War II and during the 1970s. It is worth noting that, after the end of
World War I, most countries experienced low inflation rates as they tried to return
to the gold standard. This led many people to expect low inflation rates after
World War II, and many economists thought that the biggest challenge after the
war would be slow growth and high unemployment (Studenski and Krooss, 1963).
What actually happened is that average inflation rate in the decade after WWII
was 7 percentage points higher than the average inflation rate in the decade after
WWI. The other period with high incidence of inflation surprise years, in the 1970s,
corresponds to a period of oil shocks and a surge in the price of commodities.
The main conclusion from this exercise is that financial repression appears to
have been more important than inflation surprises in reducing government debt.
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3.4.5 Are the Results Biased by Bonds Issued Before 1945?
Inflation rates were lower before WWII which, absent any restrictions, should
be reflected in lower nominal interest rates. If a large proportion of the bonds in a
country’s portfolio were issued prior to 1945, then the results may be biased by the
returns on these bonds.
The richness of the database allows me to look at the issuance patterns over
time, to get a sense of what fraction of debt is issued before 1945 and the importance
of this issue. In most countries, many new securities were issued every period and
securities issued after 1945 quickly account for most of the debt. The exception is
Japan, where there were not many instruments issued between the end of WWII
and 1965. The maturity structure also means that most of the debt matures within
the sample period; as perpetual securities, such as the consols in the UK, account
for small fractions of the overall portfolios.
It may still be the case that the liquidation effects are not common for debt
issued after 1945. To check this, I analyze the performance of bonds issued after
1945 in Australia, India and Ireland, which are countries for which the necessary
data were available. The Yield to Maturity (YTM) is used to study the performance
of the bonds. The YTM is a measure of the per-period return an investor expects
to receive by holding a security until its maturity date. It is sometimes referred to












Where Ct is the coupon payment, Pt is the price of the security at time t, and
r is the YTM. The YTM is the rate of discount at which the present value of the
promised future cash flows is equal to the price of the security.
As mentioned before, the YTM should reflect the investor’s inflation expecta-
tions at the time the bond was issued. Investors are likely to have in mind a possible
distribution for future inflation. While this is not directly observable, two extreme
assumptions about the real returns and inflation expected by investors can provide
lower and upper bounds on the nominal YTM. First, to calculate a lower bound,
suppose investors expected a zero real return and so expected an inflation rate equal
to the YTM for each period. Alternatively, suppose investors expected a real return
equal to the nominal YTM, so that they expected an inflation rate equal to zero.
This can be thought of an upper bound, and these extremes can be used to bound
the ex ante real YTM as of time of issuance.
The final step in calculating the real return consists of expressing the cash flows
of each security for each year until maturity in real terms. The year of issuance for
each security is used to deflate the cashflows. Having obtained these real cash flows,
and using equation (3.21), I can calculate the YTM that would deliver that stream
of cashflows given the price at which the security was issued. This is the ex post
real YTM as of time of issuance, and provides a measure of real returns within the
sample period based on expectations at time of issuance.
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Australian data is available for the period 1945-1968, Indian data for 1960-
1978, and Irish data for 1965-1975. The data for each security issued within these
years consists of the price and date of issuance, maturity date, and coupon rate. All
of the securities mature before 2010.
Figure 3.2 shows, at the time securities were issued, the frequency distribution
for both the ex ante real YTM and ex post real YTM. When it is assumed that
the expected inflation rate is equal to the YTM in each period, there is a mass
concentrated at zero which is shown by the vertical solid line in each panel. It
follows then that, even without knowing what inflation expectations investors had,
the actual distribution for the ex ante real YTM should be somewhere between the
two solid black lines. As the figures for the three countries show, the distribution for
the ex post real return is always to the left of the ex ante, which suggests negative
real returns were common. In the case of India and Ireland, the overlap between the
two distributions is close to zero. The share of observations with negative ex post
real YTM is 54 percent in Australia, 85 percent in Ireland, and 94 percent in India.
Summary information on the nominal and ex post real YTM appears in Table
3.10. For each country, I show the average, maximum and minimum for the nominal
YTM at issuance and the ex post real YTM as of time of issuance. On average, the
ex post real YTM was negative in all countries.
The findings of this exercise show that the results presented in the previous
subsection are not biased by securities that were issued before 1945, and that neg-
ative real returns were common for securities issued within the sample period. The
results provide further evidence that the presence of financial repression is an im-
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portant factor for explaining the incidence and magnitude of the liquidation effect.
3.4.6 Comparison to Inflation Tax
Inflation has usually been considered as a tax on real cash balances (Friedman,
1971). It is important to compare the revenues from the liquidation effect to those
from the inflation tax, in order to understand the incentives of governments to
use inflation as a broader source of revenue. Calvo and Leiderman (1992) showed
evidence that in some situations the observed inflation rate is above the rate at
which seigniorage is maximized. The authors argued that countries were sometimes
setting inflation rates in the inefficient side of the Laffer Curve. However, if debt
liquidation revenues are an additional source of revenue generated by the inflation
rate, then it may not be that the observed inflation rates were too high but that the
tax bases were larger than previously thought. Support for this possibility comes
from Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2009), who noted during several episodes of high
inflation that the debt-to-GDP ratio was much higher than the ratio of the monetary
stock to GDP.
The inflation tax can be collected every period, which is not generally the case
for the "liquidation effect" tax. For this reason, instead of comparing year-on-year
revenues from each source, a comparison is conducted over subperiods. The revenues






Where πt is the inflation rate. This is the component of seigniorage that would
be collected in steady state (see footnote 10). The monetary aggregate used is M1,
which is the most liquid monetary aggregate. This is the measure used by Rodriguez
(1994) and Easterly et al. (1995) for instance. If the monetary base was used instead
of M1, then the estimates for the inflation tax would be lower because the monetary
base is a fraction of M1.
After calculating the revenues from each source, the sample is split into subpe-
riods of at least 10 years so that each country (except Ireland) has three subperiods
that cover the 1945-1980 period. Using the official CPI, the revenues for each year
are expressed in constant terms. The base year is the first year in each subperiod.
To illustrate, total revenues for the subperiod 1945-1956 are expressed in 1945 dol-
lars. The revenues are then added up and expressed in terms of the GDP of the
base year.
The results of such comparison are displayed in Table 3.11, with countries
grouped according to the main patterns that can be observed. The first group of
countries has liquidation revenues that are consistently higher or similar to those
from the inflation tax across the subperiods. These countries are Belgium, India,
Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In Belgium and the UK, the liquidation
effect dominated the inflation tax both in the decade after 1945 and in the 1970s.
For India, Ireland and Sweden, the revenues from each source are broadly similar in
all subperiods.
The second group of countries have liquidation revenues which are relatively
large in the first subperiod (normally 1945-1956), then have relatively larger inflation
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tax revenues in later periods. Countries in this group are Australia, France, Japan,
and the United States. Their liquidation effect revenues are higher than those from
the inflation tax in the first subperiod, when debt was very large. In the subsequent
subperiods, when the debt stock had been reduced and the incidence and magnitude
of the liquidation effect declined, the inflation tax revenues were relatively higher.
In Australia and the United States the revenues from the liquidation effect increase
again during 1969-1980 but do not surpass those from the inflation tax. The case of
Japan28 highlights the point that in some episodes of high inflation the revenue from
liquidating debt were higher than those from the inflation tax. For the period 1946-
1956 the revenues from liquidation effect were 73.6 percent whereas the revenues
from inflation tax were 15.3 percent.
In the third group of countries, which are Argentina, Italy, and South Africa,
the revenues from the inflation tax are higher than those from the liquidation effect
in all subperiods. Debt in Italy had been reduced before the start of the first
subperiod, whereas the money supply remained higher for a longer period of time.
In South Africa, the debt ratio was low and inflation averaged a relatively low 3.5
percent between 1945 and 1972.
Despite the fact that the liquidation effect may not be collected every year,
during periods of high incidence of the liquidation effect the revenues obtained from
this source are usually higher than the revenues from inflation tax. Liquidation rev-
enues were relatively high when the debt stocks were large. Looking at the revenues
from both sources together, this suggests that the total tax revenues generated by
28Similar results are found (though not reported) for Italy for the period 1942-1947.
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inflation can be significantly higher than previously thought. The effective tax base,
at least during this period of high incidence of negative real interest rates, should
be thought of as the stock of domestic debt in addition to the money stock.
3.4.7 Effect on the Stock of Debt
To this point, I have focused on the effect of inflation on the government debt
on a year-on-year basis. There is also a cumulative effect on the stock of debt, as by
paying lower interest on its debt the government has a lower deficit which affects its
needs for new debt issuance and future interest payments. One way to capture the
magnitude of this cumulative effect is by assessing what each country’s debt-to-GDP
ratio would have under plausible alternative inflation paths. As it will be shown, a
small difference in the average inflation rate can have large effects on the stock of
debt.
To capture the effect on the stock of debt, the following equation of motion
for the government debt is used:
Bt
PtrGDPt







Where Bt is the stock of domestic debt, Pt is the implicit price level, rGDPt
is the real GDP, it is the nominal interest rate, πt is the net inflation rate, gt is the
net real growth rate and deft is the primary deficit.
A series for the primary deficit is generated using the estimated values for the
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nominal interest rate, together with observed values for the real stock of debt, real
growth and inflation. I assume that the primary deficit remains unchanged under
the different inflation scenarios. Debt ratios are then obtained for different inflation
paths.
Three alternative paths for the inflation rate are assumed: (i) the inflation rate
is equal to the country’s median inflation between 1930 and 2010, (ii) the inflation
rate is equal to the (weighted) average nominal interest rate of the corresponding
year, and (iii) the inflation rate is equal to 2 percent.29 These different alternatives
help to understand the effect that inflation can have in shaping debt dynamics.
Under the first scenario, I assume that the experience in each country during the
sample period is comparable to its inflation rate during a longer period of time.
With the second scenario, I compare the actual debt dynamics to a situation where
real interest rates are zero in every period. By assuming an inflation rate of 2
percent, which is a common inflation target nowadays in many countries, in the
third scenario it is possible to explore how the debt ratios in these countries would
have evolved if that inflation target had been in place.
Table 3.12 shows the results of the analysis. Column (1) shows the debt-to-
GDP ratios at the start of the sample period (normally 1945), while Column (2)
shows the debt-to- GDP ratios at the end of the sample period (normally 1980).
Columns (3) to (5) show what the debt-to-GDP ratio would have been at the end
of the sample period under the three alternative inflation paths.
The exercise highlights the cumulative effect of inflation on the dynamics of
29Under (i) and (iii), the inflation rate remains constant over time.
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the debt- to-GDP ratio. Compounding means that relatively small differences in
the inflation rate has large long-term effects on debt-to-GDP ratio. For example,
the United States had an actual debt-to-GDP ratio in 1980 of 32 percent. Under
the scenario where the inflation rate is equal to the median inflation rate over 1930-
2010, which is 3.0 percent, the ratio would have been 51 percent in 1980; if the
inflation rate had been a constant 2 percent the ratio would have been 72 percent
in 1980. The cumulative liquidation effect implied a reduction of 40 percentage
points, relative to a scenario where the annual inflation rate had been 2 percent.
For the same scenario of a constant 2 percent inflation rate, the difference between
the observed and estimated debt-to-GDP ratios in the United Kingdom would have
been of 167 percentage points, leaving the debt ratio at 212 percent. In Argentina,
where actual inflation was significantly higher than the alternatives proposed, the
estimated debt-to-GDP ratios are implausible high. This is also the case for Italy
and Japan if the sample is started in the final years of WWII.
In the case of Japan the estimated ratios are shown until 1980 to make the
results comparable to those of other countries. For the period 1947-1980 the esti-
mated ratios are significantly higher than the actual debt ratio which should not be
surprising given that median inflation was 6 percent during those years. The ap-
proach can be also used to show what the debt dynamics in Japan would have been
if inflation had been higher during the period 1981-2008. The inflation rates during
this period were markedly lower than the inflation rates in the previous forty years.
Median inflation between 1981-2008 was 0.7 percent. If inflation had remained at 2
percent, conducting the same exercise as before for 1980-2008, the debt ratio would
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have been 115 percent in 2008.30 The actual debt-to-GDP ratio in 2008 was 167
percent.
3.4.8 Understanding What Affects the Probability of a Liquidation Year
In order to understand under which circumstances negative real interest rates
are most likely to occur, it is important to understand how different factors affect
the return on the portfolio of government debt. For instance, does the share of
short-term debt in the portfolio increase the probability of a liquidation year? I
run a panel-data model to understand such factors. The results should be taken as
identifying conditional correlations rather than causal relationships.
The estimated model is given by:
rCIRit = αi + γt +X’itβ + uit i = 1, ..., N
uit = ρiui,t−1 + εit t = 1, ..., T
Where i is the country identifier and t the time period, N is the total number
of countries and T is the number of time periods. The dependent variable is the
ex post real interest rate on the portfolio given by the CIR measure. The specifi-
cation includes country fixed effects (αi) to control for constant differences between
countries, and time fixed effects (γt) to control for shocks common to all countries.
30The estimated debt ratio is 87 percent under the scenario of inflation equal to historical
median inflation and 70 percent under the scenario of inflation equal to average nominal interest
rate.
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The matrix X includes a constant and a number of explanatory variables, which
are detailed in the next paragraph. The error structure allows for correlation across
countries and for autocorrelation over time with country specific autocorrelation
coefficients (ρi). The estimator is the pooled least-square estimator with an AR(1)
for the errors.31
The explanatory variables included in the regression are: the ratio of interest
payments to GDP (intgdp); the ratio of deficit to GDP (defgdp); the ratio of tax
revenues to GDP (trgdp); the share of short term debt (st); and an indicator for
central bank independence (cbind). Higher interest payments could increase a gov-
ernment’s reliance on other sources of financing and make inflation more attractive.
A higher deficit and lower tax revenues could have a similar effect. One would expect
that a higher share of short-term debt would be associated with a lower probability
of a liquidation year, because the government will need to refinance its debt sooner
in the market. The idea behind Central Bank independence is that an independent
Central Bank may be less willing to finance government deficits with inflation, which
could lead to a higher real interest rate. The sources for these variables are detailed
in the Data Appendix.
Table 3.13 shows the results from estimating this equation. The variable with
the greatest explanatory power is the interest payments-to-GDP (intgdp) variable,
which is shown in Column (1). When either deficit-to-GDP or tax revenues-to-GDP
are added, the estimated coefficients have the expected signs in each case, but tax
31The results are robust to other estimators such as Feasible Generalized Least Squares, or
allowing for other types of autocorrelation, such as a common AR(1) parameter.
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revenues are not statistically significant. This is the case both under different error
structures and different estimations. The results for both regressions are shown in
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3.13. The negative coefficient on the interest payments
variable means that increases in the variable are associated with lower real interest
rates. A higher value of the deficit variable, a less negative deficit or higher surplus,
have a positive conditional correlation with real interest payments.32
In all of the specifications, the share of short-term debt is not statistically
significant at the five percent level. This could appear at first as a surprising re-
sult given the argument that, as the government attempts to inflate away its debt,
investors would seek protection from inflation through shorter maturities and index-
ation (Blanchard et al., 1985; Spaventa, 1986). The result provides further evidence
that there were restrictions on the degree to which financial markets could respond.
Further evidence of this lack of market response is provided in Figure 3.3, which
shows the maturity structure for debt in India, Japan, and the United States. The
dark gray area is short term debt maturing in less than a year and the lighter gray
area is debt with a maturity period longer than one year.33 In all three countries,
the share of short-term debt represents less than 50 percent of the debt throughout
the sample period. In the United States, the share of short-term debt was highest
during the 1950s and early 1960s, and then declines to around 20 percent of to-
tal debt after 1965. In Japan, the share of short-term debt initially increases and
peaks around 1960, and then steadily declines to around 10 percent of the total debt
32The deficit variable is defined as the difference between revenues and spending and expressed
as a share of GDP.
33The shares of debt remain fairly constant even when medium term debt -debt maturing in 1
to 5 years- is included.
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by 1980. While India exhibits the largest share of short-term debt throughout the
whole sample period, after an increase in the first decade the fraction of short-term
debt is reasonably stable. The fact that despite the large incidence of negative real
interest rate, governments were able to issue debts at a fairly unchanged interest
rate and still at long maturities can be interpreted as further evidence of financial
repression during the period 1945-1980.
The last variable added, Column (5), is Central Bank Independence (cbind)
which is not statistically significant at the five percent level. One possible explana-
tion is that there are not many observations after 1980 when central banks became
more independent. An alternative explanation could be related to Alesina and Sum-
mer’s (1993) finding that, although a higher degree of central bank independence
is associated to a lower inflation rate, there is no correlation between central bank
independence and real interest rates levels or variability.
A government’s fiscal position is an important determinant of the likelihood of
a liquidation year. After controlling for several factors, including the share of short-
term debt, worsening government finances are associated with lower real interest
rates on government debt. Montiel (2003) argued that financial repression has a
fiscal origin, in the sense that the inability of a government to collect revenues from
traditional sources forces it to seek other sources of revenues. In the case of financial
repression, this constitutes an implicit tax on the financial sector. The results of this
exercise suggest that there is a high conditional correlation between fiscal variables
and negative real interest rates, but the exercise cannot determine whether these
are causal relationships.
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3.5 How did Investors Fare During this Period?
In this section, I compare the relative performance of bills, bonds and stocks.
In order to understand investors’ options and whether financial repression policies
were key to the low returns on government bonds over the 1945-1980 period, I
compare the returns on bonds to other financial assets during this period as well
as in the decades before 1945 and after 1980. The returns on bonds during the
1945-1980 were poor relative to the return on stocks, but higher than that on other
assets during the same period.
This suggests governments were able to generate demand for their securities,
and provides further evidence that the presence of financial repression during the
sample period affected the return on government bonds. During World War II,
countries imposed controls on the economy in order to obtain the physical and
monetary resources necessary to fight the war.34 The objective of governments was
the same across countries: to direct funds towards government bonds while keeping
the interest rate on their securities at low levels. Although the War officially ended
in 1945, it took several decades to dismantle the restrictions that had been imposed
during the war. Direct evidence on policies implemented during the sample period
can be found in Appendix sec:historyFR.
34Oosterlinck (2010) discusses the situation in the French stock market during the war; and also
refers to the situation in other countries such as Belgium, the UK and the US.
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3.5.1 Stocks, Bills and Bonds during the Sample Period
Table 3.14 shows the real returns using the portfolio of government debt us-
ing the Contractual Interest Rate and Holding Period Return measures, together
with real returns on bills (short-term debt) and the stock market. For each of the
variables, I present the geometric return, the arithmetic return and the standard
deviation of the real returns. The geometric (or compound) return is the most
appropriate measure to compare investments over a longer period of time (Bodie,
Kane and Marcus, 2009), but I show the results are also similar when the arithmetic
return is used. This information is provided for every country except Argentina and
Ireland, as they had no stock market data that included dividends.
The most accurate measure on government bonds is the HPR, since it incor-
porates capital gains and losses. The CIR is also presented, however, because the
HPR is not available for all of the countries. The results are generally similar, al-
though the average real returns measured by CIR are one percentage point lower
than those measured by HPR. This suggests that capital gains partially compensated
investors for low interest payments. As a reminder, the measures for the return on
government bonds are for the portfolio of government securities, and hence contain
securities of various maturities. The return for short term government securities,
bills, is presented separately as well.
The stock market returns were calculated using the most comprehensive index
available for each country. In all cases, the indexes include both dividends and
price changes. Details on the indexes used and their sources are included in ??.
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The results for Japan and Sweden correspond to the period 1945-1980, so that the
experience in these countries can be compared to that of the other countries in the
sample.
In all countries, the average real return from the stock market is positive
whereas the real return from government bonds is negative (except for Belgium
under the HPR measure). This is true for both the short term and overall portfolio
of government securities. The fact that the geometric mean is negative implies that
someone who invested at the beginning of the period recovered less than the initial
investment at the end of the sample period. For an investor who invested $1,000 in
US government bonds in 1945, he would have received $824 in 1980 (measured in
1945 dollars). An investor in the United Kingdom would have recovered 58 percent
of their initial investment during the same sample period.
The standard deviation for the portfolio of debt is lower than the standard
deviation for stocks, which implies that there is a trade-off between risk and return..
A simple way to look at this trade-off is to compute the percentage of the time that
stocks outperformed bonds for holding periods of different lengths. In Table 3.15, I
present these percentages for holding periods of one, two, five, ten, 20 and 30 years
for both the CIR and HPR measures. The way to read the table is as follows: in
Australia, stocks perform better than bonds in 71 percent of all two year holding
periods, 96 percent of 10 year holding periods and 100 percent of the 20 and 30 year
holding periods. In all of the countries and under both measures, stocks tend to
outperform bonds regardless of the holding period. In around 60 percent of the one
year holding periods, stocks perform better than bonds. This suggests that, even
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over short investment horizons, stocks outperform bonds and make it unlikely that
risk could explain the differences in returns between bonds and stocks.
The calculations reported in this table are before-tax returns. In order to be
able to calculate after-tax returns, one would need historical information on the
tax codes of the different countries. Siegel (2008) calculated historical after-tax
returns for the United States, and finds that stocks to have a tax advantage relative
to bonds. This occurs because relatively most of the return on stocks come from
capital gains rather than dividend payments, and capital gain taxes can be deferred
until the assets are sold so that the investment grows at the before-tax rate. The
difficulty of extending this to other countries is that, while dividend and income
taxes are usually higher than capital gain taxes, government securities often receive
special tax treatment. This special treatment for government bonds makes it hard
to know which group of assets had a tax advantage in other countries.35
3.5.2 A Longer Historical Perspective
Dimson, Marsh, and Stauton (2002) and Siegel (2008) provide evidence that
investing in the stock market is the best alternative for investors with a long time
horizon, at least in advanced economies. They do this by comparing the returns on
equity, bonds and bills in samples that span more than 100 years.
The results presented by these authors are useful to put the returns during the
1945-1980 period into historical perspective. Siegel (2008), who focuses on the US
35For instance, in the US municipal bonds are tax-exempt. In the UK private investors in Gilts
are not liable for capital taxes.
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economy, reports that the annual real return on long-term government bonds was 4.8
percent over 1802-1870, 3.7 percent over 1871-1925, and 2.4 percent between 1926-
2006. If the last subperiod is further split into smaller subperiods, it becomes clear
that the low real returns are driven by the negative average real returns between
1945-1980. This suggests that the 1945-1980 period was distinctive in terms of the
poor real returns on US government bonds.
Dimson et al. (2002) reported real returns on bonds, bills and stocks for all of
the countries in my sample except Argentina and India. Tables 3.16 and 3.17 show
these returns over 1900 to 2000, as well as over 1900-1939, 1940-1979 and 1980-
2000. The returns on bonds for both 1900-1939 and 1980-2000 periods were higher
than those during the 1940-1979 period in all of the countries except Belgium. In
Australia, the annual real return on bonds from 1900-2000 was 1.1 percent while the
real return between 1940-1980 was -2.8 percent. In the United States, the equivalent
numbers are 1.6 percent and -1.8 percent respectively.
Bills are short-term securities, which should quickly reflect changes in inflation
expectations and market interest rates in a well-functioning market. The fact that
the average real return on bills was negative in all countries during 1940-1979 offers
supportive evidence of the presence of financial repression. Average real returns on
bills are rarely negative in earlier and later periods.. Across the ten countries for
which this information is available, the average real return on bills was 1.0 percent
between 1900-1939, -3.6 percent between 1940-1979, and 3.5 percent between 1980-
2000.
In contrast to the performance of government bonds and bills, the real return in
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the stock market was positive in all subperiods in all countries (with the exception of
Italy between 1940-1979). There is no common pattern for stock returns across the
1900-1939 and 1940-1979 subperiods, while the return for the 1980-2000 subperiod
was markedly higher. This last observation will be important next, when the equity
premium is re-examined.
3.5.3 The Equity Premium Puzzle Revisited
The equity premium is the excess return on equities over a risk-free asset, such
as US T-bills, and is a key variable in many asset pricing models. Mehra and Prescott
published a paper titled The Equity Premium: A Puzzle?" in 1985, where they found
that the historical equity premium was far higher than the premium that could
be rationalize by a standard neoclassical model. Specifically, the observed equity
premium over a 100 year period was more than 6 percent, whereas the premium
predicted by the model was 1.4 percent. An additional finding at odds with the
empirical evidence was that the risk free rate predicted by the model was 13.2
percent, whereas the average risk free rate observed in the data was less than 1
percent.
A large literature has attempted to explain this puzzle. Mehra (2006) summa-
rizes the different explanations that have been provided, dividing the explanations
into those that are risk-based and those that are not. Under the first category,
Mehra groups explanations that have been successful at obtaining a risk free rate
in line with the empirical evidence but have failed to explain the equity premium.
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Examples of this are models which propose alternative preferences (e.g., habit for-
mation), different probability distributions (e.g., adding a disaster state), and be-
havioral models where agents are not fully rational. Mehra concludes that: "The
difficulty that several model classes have collectively had in explaining the equity
premium as a compensation for bearing risk leads us to conclude that perhaps it is
not a "risk premium" but rather due to other factors." Papers that explore explana-
tions that are not risk- ased use models which take into account market frictions or
allow for incomplete markets, by adding characteristics like borrowing constraints,
transaction costs and taxes.36
The particularly low bond returns during the 1945-1980 period may account
for some of the equity premium. To examine this, I calculate the equity premium
for rolling 30-year periods over time spans in the United States and the United
Kingdom.37 These are plotted in Figure 3.4, with the US results shown in Panel
A and the UK results in Panel B. The shaded areas correspond to the period of
financial repression (1945-1980). The data for the UK is available for the 1800-2010
period and for the US it is available for the 1870-2010 period, so that the first 30-year
period is 1829 and 1899 respectively.
The first observation is that the equity premium has varied significantly over
time, and it has even been negative at times in the United Kingdom. The second,
more important observation is that the peak in the equity premium in both countries
coincides with the period of financial repression. Excluding 1945-1980, the average
36In addition to Mehra (2006), Kocherlakota (1996), Cochrane (1997) and Campbell (1999,
2001) also offer surveys of the literature on the equity premium.
37Each observation is the geometric mean for the equity premium over the preceding 30 years
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equity premium for the period 1900-2010 is 2.1 percent in the UK and 4.4 percent
in the US. This compares with the average equity premia for the 1945-1980 period
of 6.7 percent in the UK and 8.3 percent in the US.
McGrattan and Prescott (2003) argue that one should take into account the
role of taxes, diversification costs and regulatory constraints as determinants of
the equity premium. Although some of their results are encouraging, further work
should be done to try to measure the effect of financial regulations, including taxes
and other restrictions, in shaping the equity premium.
The observations of this section have potentially important implications for
understanding the equity premium and the equity premium puzzle. First, a success-
ful model of the equity premium should take into account the effect of regulations
and institutional background. Trying to explain the average equity premium with-
out acknowledging its large variations over time may not be particularly helpful to
model prospective risk. In addition, if one believes that to some extent it is possible
a return to a more tightly regulated financial system, then one should expect to
observe a larger equity premium.
3.6 Conclusion
As a result of the recent financial crisis, the public debt ratios of advanced
economies have increased to levels not seen since World War II. This raises questions
as to how governments will reduce their debt burden. Studying how countries coped
with similar situations in the past can shed light on the effectiveness and implications
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of the different alternatives. In this paper, I provide empirical evidence that inflation
reduced post-World War II debts. I show the conditions under which inflation was
effective and the implications for both governments and investors.
In combination with financial repression, inflation was an effective mechanism
to reduce large debt burdens. Negative real interest rates were common and large in
magnitude across the 12 countries under study. On average, the real interest rates
on the portfolio of domestic government securities were negative in half of the obser-
vations in my sample. Implicit government revenues averaged two to three percent
of GDP. When the sample is broken into smaller subperiods, it becomes apparent
that there was a high incidence of the effect both in the years after the end of World
War II and during the 1970s. In France, Italy and Japan, the countries which ex-
perienced the highest inflation rates after the war, the revenues as a proportion of
GDP averaged 12 to 17 percent between 1945 and1956.
A conceptual framework was developed to identify the channels through which
inflation can have an effect in reducing government debt, and to show how to think
of financial repression as a restructuring mechanism. Several exercises were con-
ducted to separate their relative contribution. The results consistently point to the
importance of financial repression, rather than unanticipated inflation, in explain-
ing the high incidence of negative real interest rates. For instance, when inflation
expectations are measured I find that inflation surprises occur in only 15 percent of
liquidation years.
Of the various exercises focused on governments, two are worth emphasizing.
First, when compared to other sources of government revenue, liquidation revenues
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are large. On average, liquidation revenues are equivalent to one fifth of tax revenues,
and they are sometimes significantly larger than those from the inflation tax. Second,
the results of a multivariate analysis point at an important connection between fiscal
variables and the presence of the liquidation effect. While this is consistent with the
argument by Montiel (2003) about financial repression having a fiscal origin, further
work is required to understand whether the links between the variables are causal.
Most of the sample period coincides with the Bretton Woods era, which was
characterized by the presence of tightly regulated capital flows. This appears to
have facilitated domestic policies that kept interest rates on government debt arti-
ficially low. Further evidence of the presence of financial repression and its effect
is provided by looking at the return of government bonds for the period 1900-2000.
The real returns on bonds were significantly higher both in the period before and
after 1940-1980. The presence of frictions in financial markets during this period
is also apparent when looking at the average real returns on Treasury Bills, which
were negative in all of the countries in the sample between 1940 and 1980.
The abnormally low real return for bonds during the period of financial re-
pression is also reflected in the equity premium. The equity premium, calculated
over 30-year rolling periods, was the highest during the decades after World War II
that are studied in this paper. In the United States, the average equity premium
from 1870 to the present is 4.4 percent while the average equity premium during
1945-1980 is almost twice as large at 8.3 percent. These findings may be relevant
for understanding the equity premium puzzle, and suggest that studies trying to as-
sess prospective risk should take into account the significant effect that government
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intervention can have on the return of different assets.
Real growth is unlikely to play a major role in reducing debt burdens at least in
the next few years. Moreover, conditional on being able to implement fiscal austerity
measures, the evidence on their success is limited to a few countries (Perotti, 2011).
The options left are explicit defaults and restructurings, or the mechanisms studied
in this paper. In the last three decades, the world has moved towards a more
financially liberalized environment, which means that the magnitudes found here
may not be representative of what could happen in the future. There have been
some recent regulatory changes, however, that suggest governments may still be able
to pay low real returns on their debt in difficult times. That, together with the scale
and breadth of how inflation was used to liquidate government debt in the period
under study, suggests we should pay more attention to the use and implications of
this debt-reduction mechanism.
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Figure 3.1: Debt-to-GDP, Real Growth Rate and Distribution of Real Returns
Panel A: Debt-to-GDP Ratios 
 
Panel B: Real Growth Rate (5-year moving average) 
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Table 3.1: Countries in the Sample and Sample Periods
Country Period Change in debt-to-GDP in percentage points (p.p.)
Argentina 1942-1980 15.2 p.p. (from 42.2 to 27.0)
Australia 1945-1980 124.6 p.p (from 143.8 to 19.3)
Belgiuma 1945-1974 74.4 p.p. (from 112.8 to 38.4)
Franceb 1945-1980* 97.9 p.p. (from 104.1 to 6.2)
India 1949-1980 (1.4) p.p. (from 27.5 to 28.9)
Ireland 1960-1990 1.8 p.p. (from 54.7 to 52.8)
Italyc 1946-1980 11.6 p.p. (from 37.2 to 25.6)
Japan 1946-2008 (82.6) p.p. (from 82.6 to 164.2)
South Africa 1945-1980 40.6 p.p. (from 73.0 to 32.4)
Sweden 1945-1990 13.9 p.p. (from 52.0 to 38.1)
United Kingdom 1945-1980 169.1 p.p. (from 210.0 to 40.9)
United States 1945-1980 85.0 p.p. (from 118.4 to 33.4)
a Missing data for 1964-1968
b Missing data 1953-1958 and 1960-1963
c The debt ratio in 1942 was 118 percent of GDP.
Table 3.2: Summary of Inflation and Real Interest Rate (in percent)
Country Inflation CIR HPRAverage Median St. Dev. Average Median St. Dev. Average Median St. Dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Argentina 53.4 21.7 81.0 -19.4 -14.1 18.3 -14.1 -11.0 15.9
Australia 6.4 4.3 5.4 -1.7 -0.3 4.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Belgium 3.9 3.2 4.0 -0.6 0.2 4.3 1.0 2.0 5.8
France 12.2 6.0 17.7 -7.3 -2.4 12.7 n.a. n.a. n.a.
India 5.2 4.4 7.5 -0.7 -0.4 6.8 -1.3 -0.7 6.9
Ireland 8.5 6.7 6.2 -1.3 -0.8 4.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Italy 8.3 4.6 10.1 -1.6 0.4 6.8 -0.6 0.7 5.7
Japan 27.2 5.6 73.7 -1.5 1.2 12.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
South Africa 5.2 4.1 3.8 -0.5 0.2 2.7 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sweden 5.9 5.7 3.9 0.2 0.5 3.4 -0.9 -0.2 4.7
UK 6.3 4.2 5.8 -1.4 -0.6 3.7 -1.2 -0.1 7.3
US 4.6 3.2 4.4 -0.8 0.3 4.1 -0.4 0.0 4.2
Average 12.3 6.1 18.6 -3.1 -1.3 7.0 -2.5 -1.3 7.2
Notes: See Table 3.1 for sample period.
a Missing data for 1964-1968
b Missing data 1953-1958 and 1960-1963
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Table 3.3: Incidence of Liquidation Years
Country Period Share of Liquidation Years for different subperiod
Full Sample 1945-1956 1957-1968 1969-1980 1981-1993 1994-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Argentina 1942-1980 92 80 100 100 - -
Australia 1945-1980 53 67 8 83 -
Belgiuma 1945-1974 48 42 14 100 - -
Franceb 1945-1980 77 75 50 92 - -
India 1949-1980 53 25 67 58 - -
Ireland 1960-1990 68 - 78 92 30 -
Italy 1946-1980 49 36 25 83 - -
Japan 1946-2008 35c 64 42 75 0 7
South Africa 1945-1980 47 58 8 75 - -
Sweden 1945-1990 48 42 50 83 10 -
United Kingdom 1945-1980 58 67 25 83 - -
United States 1945-1980 50 58 17 75 - -
Average 56 56 40 83 13 7
Notes: Share of liquidation years is calculated as the ratio between number of years in which the real return
was negative and the total number of years in the corresponding subperiod. The measure of real interest rate
is the Contractual Interest Rate (CIR).
- Subperiods not included in the sample of the country
a Missing data for 1964-1968
b Missing data 1953-1958 and 1960-1963
c The share of liquidation years for the period 1946-1980 is 60 percent
Table 3.4: Liquidation Rate
Country
Average Liquidation Effect Minimum
Full Sample 1945-1956 1957-1968 1969-1980 1981-1993 1994-2008 (Year)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Argentina 21.4 13.0 17.0 34.2 - - 72.3 (1976)
Australia 4.6 6.8 0.9 3.2 - - 15.1 (1952)
Belgium 4.2 6.0 1.0 3.1 - - 9.6 (1974)
France 9.8 26.8 1.4 2.9 - - 41.2 (1946)
India 5.4 6.0 4.8 5.8 - - 17.4 (1974)
Ireland 3.4 - 1.0 4.4 5.7 - 12.7 (1975)
Italy 6.0 13.3 2.1 4.2 - - 27.6 (1947)
Japan 13.2 35.0 2.2 3.7 * 0.1 78.5 (1946)
South Africa 3.0 2.7 0.5 3.3 - - 6.8 (1975)
Sweden 2.6 4.7 1.2 2.4 2.9 - 11.9 (1951)
United Kingdom 3.5 2.7 0.5 5.1 - - 10.9 (1975)
United States 3.5 4.1 0.1 3.7 - - 13.7 (1946)
Average 6.7 11.0 2.7 6.3 4.3 0.1
Notes: The liquidation rate is absolute value of the real interest rate during liquidation years.
See table 3.3 for sample period. The measure of real interest rate is the Contractual Interest Rate.
- Subperiods not included in the sample of the country
* Subperiods which are part of the sample but have no LE years
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Table 3.5: Liquidation Revenues
Country Average Liquidation Effect Revenues as percentage of GDP
Full Sample 1945-1956 1957-1968 1969-1980 1981-1993 1994-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Argentina 3.1 3.8 3.0 2.5 -
Australia 3.3 6.7 0.6 0.8 - -
Belgium 2.5 4.9 0.6 1.3 - -
France 3.8 12.4 0.2 0.2 - -
India 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.5 - -
Ireland 1.8 - 0.5 2.2 2.9 -
Italy 1.6 13.3 0.4 1.1 - -
Japan 5.9 17.8 0.1 0.6 * 0.1
South Africa 1.3 1.5 0.2 1.2 - -
Sweden 0.8 1.6 0.3 0.6 1.3 -
United Kingdom 3.0 4.4 0.6 2.6 - -
United States 2.3 4.3 0.0 1.2 - -
Notes:See Table 3.3 for sample period.The measure of real interest rate is the Contractual Interest Rate.
- Subperiods not included in the sample of the country
* Subperiods which are part of the sample but have no LE years
Table 3.6: Comparison Liquidation Revenues as percentage of:
Country
GDP Tax Revenues
CIR HPR CIR HPR
Average Median Average Median Average Median Average Median
Argentina 3.1 2.4 3.1 2.2 38.3 27.3 39.0 28.6
Australia 3.3 1.1 n.a. n.a. 12.9 4.4 n.a. n.a.
Belgium 2.5 1.2 3.5 3.5 18.6 10.3 23.9 18.9
France 3.8 0.2 35.3 1.1
India 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.8 27.2 27.6 27.2 28.4
Ireland 1.8 1.1 n.a. n.a. 7.9 6.1 n.a. n.a.
Italy 1.6 0.8 1.6 0.7 24.6 5.4 26.5 4.9
Japan 5.9 0.4 n.a. n.a. 37.9 3.0 n.a. n.a.
South Africa 1.3 1.4 n.a. n.a. 8.0 6.8 n.a. n.a.
Sweden 0.8 0.4 1.3 0.9 4.4 2.1 4.4 2.1
United Kingdom 3.0 1.9 3.1 1.8 18.8 11.0 19.6 10.0
United States 2.3 0.7 2.7 1.3 13.4 3.9 15.9 7.1
Notes:See Table 3.3 for sample period.
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Table 3.9: Inflation Surprises and Liquidation Years
Country
Share of Overlap Liquidation Years
Inflation Suprises CIR HPR
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Argentina 42 17 43 17 32 4
Australia 25 8 42 16
Belgium 8 4 18 9 13 13
France 15 12 20 15
India 9 6 18 6 18 6
Ireland 6 3 10 5
Italy 22 14 39 28 39 28
Japan 14 8 39 22
South Africa 19 8 35 18
Sweden 9 4 18 9 18 9
UK 17 8 29 14 29 14
US 11 9 22 17 17 17
Average 17 8 28 15 24 13
Notes: Inflation suprises are defined as years where the realized
inflation rate is two standard deviations above the estimated expected
inflation rate. The actual standard errors cannot be obtained but
a lower and upper bound for them.
Table 3.10: Comparison between Ex Ante and Ex Post Yield to Maturity for secu-
rities issued within sample period (in percent)
Country Nominal YTM at issuance Ex-post real YTM as of time of issuance Number of bondsAverage Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum
Australiaa 4.2 5.4 2.0 -0.6 4.7 -12.3 50
Indiab 5.3 6.5 3.6 -2.3 4.6 -5.0 98
Irelandc 8.4 14.6 5.4 -2.2 3.5 -10.2 26
a Bonds issued between 1945-1968
b Bonds issued between 1960-1978
c Bonds issued between 1965-1975
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Table 3.11: Comparison Liquidation Effect Revenues and Inflation Tax (as %GDP)





Belgium 1945-1954 13.8 23.3
1955-1964 4.1 3
1965-1974 1.1 7.3
India 1949-1959 8.4 6.3
1960-1969 11.5 10.9
1970-1980 15.5 13.9
Ireland 1960-1969 13.8 7.6
1970-1979 20.4 25.5
1980-1990 10.6 11.2











Australia 1945-1956 43.6 65.3
1957-1968 7.8 0.5
1969-1980 22.6 14.8
France 1945-1956 74.1 97.5
1957-1968 16.1 0.8
1969-1980 23.7 2.1












Argentina 1945-1956 61.4 53.5
1957-1968 42.4 37.8
1969-1980 50.3 40.2
Italy 1946-1956 29.7 19.2
1957-1968 15.8 1.8
1969-1980 117.1 23.4












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Argentina 1942-1980 42.0 10.4 181.4 2914.2 8080.2
Australia 1945-1980 145.4 18.1 50.3 40.5 98.9
Belgiuma 1945-1974* 112.8 38.4 54.5 45.5 64.2
Franceb 1945-1980* 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
India 1949-1980 26.2 25.4 24.3 39.0 71.1
Ireland 1960-1990 61.7 48.4 242.3 53.1 346.4
Italy 1946-1980 67.0 26.2 97.0 58.9 220.4
Japan 1947-1980 27.5 39.1 257.4 137.6 355.9
South Africa 1945-1980 56.6 32.1 28.5 43.3 109.9
Sweden 1945-1990 52.6 39.2 91.0 37.6 224.8
United Kingdom 1945-1980 236.2 44.4 111.6 82.7 211.7
United States 1945-1980 116.0 31.6 50.7 33.8 71.7
Notes: Initial D/GDP refers to the debt ratio in the first year of the sample period for each country, and the
D/GDP (end) is the debt ratio in the last year of the sample.
a Missing data for 1964-1968
b Missing data 1953-1958 and 1960-1963
Table 3.13: Panel Estimation Results- Dependent Variable: CIR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
intgdp -0.230*** -0.218*** -0.221*** -0.221*** -0.220***
(-16.07) (-18.81) (-12.84) (-18.70) (-18.74)









Constant -0.0286 0.0563 -0.0207 0.154*** 0.179***
(-0.72) (1.35) (-0.39) (3.40) (3.88)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 446 445 443 434 432
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.15: Percentage of the time stocks outperform bonds for different holding
periods
Country Sample Period
Stocks outperform CIR Stocks outperfom HPR
holding periods (in years) holding periods (in years)
1 2 5 10 20 30 1 2 5 10 20 30
Australia 1945-1980 64 71 75 96 100 100
Belgiuma 1945-1974 58 60 66 89 100 100 53 51 63 59 65 100
Franceb 1945-1980 56 66 72 78 94 100
India 1949-1980 66 68 79 83 100 100 66 71 82 87 100 100
Italy 1946-1980 64 63 59 67 82 100 64 63 59 67 76 100
Japan 1946-2008 61 77 94 100 100 100
South Africac 1949-1980 62 65 88 100 100
Sweden 1945-1990 58 63 78 89 100 100 64 66 78 89 100 100
UK 1945-1980 61 77 78 100 100 100 53 77 75 100 100 100
US 1945-1980 67 74 78 85 100 100 69 74 78 81 100 100
Notes: The geometric return for different holding periods was used.
a Missing data for 1964-1968
b Missing data 1953-1958 and 1960-1963
c Total return data for the stock market available from 1949
Table 3.16: Real Returns on Bonds and Bills during 1900-2000
Bonds Bills
1900-2000 1900-1939 1940-1979 1980-2000 1900-2000 1900-1939 1940-1979 1980-2000
Australia 1.1 2.6 -2.8 5.8 0.4 1.1 -2.5 4.9
Belgium -0.4 -3.0 -1.5 6.9 -0.3 -2.0 -0.9 4.6
France -1.0 -2.0 -4.5 7.9 -3.3 -1.8 -7.8 2.6
Ireland 1.5 0.9 -1.5 8.7 1.3 1.9 -1.1 4.5
Italy -2.2 0.1 -8.2 5.4 -4.1 -1.1 -9.5 1.1
Japan -1.6 3.1 -9.7 3.3 -2.0 3.6 -9.3 2.1
South Africa 1.4 3.4 -1.1 2.4 0.8 1.8 -1.4 3.2
Sweden 2.4 3.6 -1.4 7.3 2.0 3.5 -0.8 4.7
UK 1.3 1.0 -1.9 8.2 1.0 1.3 -1.2 4.5
US 1.6 2.3 -1.8 6.9 0.9 2.0 -1.2 2.8
Average 0.4 1.2 -3.4 6.3 -0.3 1.0 -3.6 3.5
Source: Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2002)
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Table 3.17: Real Returns on Stocks during 1900-2000
Equity
1900-2000 1900-1939 1940-1979 1980-2000
Australia 7.5 10.3 4.4 8.3
Belgium 2.5 -2.0 2.7 11.4
France 3.8 1.4 1.9 12.7
Ireland 4.8 1.3 4.2 12.7
Italy 2.7 3.3 -1.6 10.1
Japan 4.5 7.9 1.5 4.1
South Africa 6.8 7.5 6.6 6.1
Sweden 7.6 5.7 4.8 17.3
UK 5.8 3.0 5.3 12.2
US 6.7 5.2 6.0 11.2
Average 5.3 4.4 3.6 10.6
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Appendix A
Evidence of the Presence of Financial Repression
This appendix provides a description of some of the policies and regulations
that were in place during the sample period in the different countries of the sam-
ple. The policies included are examples of financial repression and hence provide
narrative evidence in support of the analysis in the main body of the paper.
It is important to understand the context in which these policies were imposed.
Financial liberalization has not evolved monotonically over time. Historical indexes
of capital mobility show that there was a peak in capital mobility in 1914 when
World War I began (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004; and Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).
After that, a period of low capital mobility -interrupted briefly during the interwar
period- lasted until 1980 when capital mobility began to increase once again.
The period of low capital mobility took place during the Bretton Woods era.
At the time there was favorable political and economic consensus to accept re-
strictions on the flow of capitals. Capital controls were viewed as a way to avoid
speculation and maintain the stability of the international financial system. Policy-
makers wanted to avoid a situation similar to the one during the interwar period,
where competitive devaluations and lack of coordination across countries were com-
mon (Bordo, 2003; Eichengreen and Sachs, 1986). Capital controls may acted by
reducing the ability to arbitrage across countries, and are only one example of the
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policies in place at the time.
Some of the policies described below provide direct evidence to restrictions in
the market of government securities, whereas some others are not directly related.
One way to interpret the evidence provided in this appendix, is that the overall set
of policies and regulations that were in placed during the period 1945-1980 speak to
a period where financial markets were highly regulated. More emphasis is placed in
the United States and the United Kingdom, countries which are usually considered
among the most financially liberalized economies in the world.
A.1 United States
Government Securities Price Support
During World War II there was an agreement between the Fed and the Trea-
sury to support the price of government securities in the market. The Treasury
had set a structure of return for securities of different maturities: 3/8 of a percent
on 90-day T-Bills, 7/8 of a percent on 12-month certificates of indebtedness, and
higher rates on long-term issues, the maximum rate was 2.5 percent on the longest
term taxable bond. The Fed announced that it would buy and sell securities in
the market in order to maintain the prices of bonds at par. As a result, long term
securities were perfectly liquid and investors were protected from capital losses.
Once the War was over, there was a consensus between the Treasury and the
Fed that the policy of low interest rates should be continued. Studenski and Krooss
(1952) wrote:
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The Treasury’s debt-management program had three principal objec-
tives: to reduce the amount of the debt, to maintain government credit
and keep debt costs low, and to widen the distribution of Federal secu-
rities. Of the three objectives, the Treasury considered the second to be
the most important, and it sought to achieve this aim by maintaining
control over interest rates and by stabilizing government security prices
at a low yield. It insisted that, if the interest rate was not controlled,
interest charges on the debt would rise, the already enormous Federal
expenditures would increase even further.
Towards the end of the decade, some members of the Fed started to push to
eliminate the price support and to allow interest rates to rise. In 1950, there was
consensus among the Fed members about the need for the change in the policy.
After several negotiations, the Fed and the Treasury reached an "accord" in March
of 1951. The joint statement issued at the time announced:
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have reached full accord
with respect to debt-management and monetary policies to be pursued
in furthering their common purpose to assure the successful financing
of the Government’s requirements and, at the same time, to minimized
monetization of the public debt.
Board Minutes, March 2 1951, 1-2
Geisst (1997) argues that the policy had an impact on future generation who
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thought of bonds as a stable investment, and got surprised by the increase in the
volatility of bonds in the late 1960s.
More details on the policy: Chandler (1949), Studenski and Krooss (1952),
Horvitz and Ward (1987), Metzler (2003)
Exchange of Marketable for Nonmarketable Debt There are several
examples of security exchanges in which marketable securities were exchanged for
non-marketable securities. As an example, in 1951, marketable bonds with a coupon
of 2.5 percent and 16 to 21 years to maturity were exchange for nonmarketable bonds
at 2.75 percent with 29.5 years to maturity. In Martin’s words:
Some people will think the 2.75 nonmarketable bond is a trick issue. We
want to meet that head on. It is. It is an attempt to lock up as much
as possible of these longer-term issues.
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury William McChesney Martin Jr. FOMC
minutes, March 1-2, 1951.
Moral Suasion
Moral Suasion refers to a situation by which the Central Bank attempts to
persuade commercial banks of following certain policy. Even if there is no legal
obligation to act accordingly, there is a view among bankers that it is better to
remain cooperative with the Fed. Horvitz and Ward (1987) give two examples of
moral suasion in the US.
The first one is related to the voluntary foreign-credit-restrain program launched
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by the Fed during the 1960s to limit the outflow of dollars from the US. There were
several calls to cooperate, but also implicit and explicit threats to those banks who
decided not to cooperate.
In September 1966, for example, the Federal Reserve Board sent a letter
to all member banks calling for restraint in granting business loans,...
The letter indicated that banks that failed to cooperate could not expect
the increase in their loan portfolios to be considered adequate reason for
the extension of Federal Reserve credit through the discount window"
Horvitz and Ward, 1987, p.348-349
The second example the authors give is related to the "New Economic Policy"
of 1971. It was a program for voluntary restrain on interest rates, administered by
the Committee on Interest and Dividend created by the Executive Order of October
15, 1971,101. According to the Order "the President established a Committee on
Interest and Dividends whose duty was to devise and execute a program to obtain
voluntary restraint on interest rates and dividends. This proposal was ratified by
Congress in the 1971." (Edward R. Lev, 1972)
Interest Rate Ceilings
"The original impetus for deposit rate ceilings in the United States rested on
the argument that excessive competition for deposits promoted instability of the
banking system by raising the cost of funds and by encouraging banks to make
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higher-risk loans." (Robert A. Taggart, 1981) After the Great Depression, interest
payments on time and saving deposits were prohibited.
The ceilings remained mostly unchanged until early 1960s when non-bank
thrift institutions were paying higher interest rates than commercial banks, as a
result of their rates being non regulated. In 1966, Regulation Q was extended to
non-thrift institutions. During the following years several changes were made to the
ceilings for different types of accounts and institutions.
In 1980, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
was passed, with effective date in 1986.
Further details on the history of Regulation Q: Green, Pentecost and Weyman-
Jones (2011)
Margin Requirements
Regulation T allowed the Fed to set margin requirements on loans by brokers
to customers. The Fed used changes in margin requirements to control the amount
of credit in the stock market. The objective of imposing higher margin requirements
was to guarantee the stability of the stock market and avoid large increases in the
prices of stocks driven by speculation or excessive use of credit. In January of 1946
the margin requirement was set to 100 percent. It subsequently fluctuated between
50-90 percent between 1947 and 1974.
Broker’s Commissions
Until May of 1975, brokerage firms were obligated to charge minimum com-
mission. Over time, brokerage firms had found ways to offer a discount to certain
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investors, such as research or other work, but their practices were to a large extent
limited.
Gold restrictions
In 1933, President Roosevelt prohibited private holdings of gold coins, bullion,
and certificates. The restriction was lift at the end of 1974.
A.2 United Kingdom
Cheap Money Policy and Minimum Price for Government Securities
Domestic financial policy during the War and in the immediate years after its
end, was design to obtain money for the government as soon as it was issued. This
was achieved primarily through Treasury Deposit Receipts (90-day nonmarketable
paper sold to banks), tap loans, and arrangements to have insurance companies
invest its funds in government securities.
Minimum prices on government securities were imposed at the beginning of the
war. The rule was only enforced in the market controlled by the London Stock Ex-
change, and trading grew outside when the price dropped below the minimum level
(Michie, 1999). The minimum prices served as a benchmark for future borrowing,
which allowed the government to issue debt at low interest rates. The controls were
not removed immediately after the war, because the government worried that spec-
ulation would lead to increase in the interest rates, which it was seen as damaging
given the weak status of the economy.
Similar to the US, there was also an interest to keep nominal interest rates at
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low levels.
In 1945 government officials and economist, including Lord Keynes,
James Meade and Lionel Robbins, recommended the retention of cheap
money and direct controls for at least a transitional period after the
war. Their advice reflected widespread anticipation of a post-war slump
like that which followed the First World War, recognition that relying
on high nominal interest rates (dear money) to restrain inflation with-
out controls would substantially increase the interest cost of the large
post-war debt, and, to a lesser extent, skepticism as to the influence of
interest rates on private sector expenditure.
Susan Howson, 1994
Interest rates were cut after the end of the war. According to Fforde (1992),
the cut was presented as a "technical adjustment", a term that would be often used
during the postwar period in the UK instead of referring to a "change of policy."
There was also a conversion of maturing stock on lower-yielding Exchequer Bonds.
Several Local Loans at 3% were exchanged for irredeemable 2.5% bonds.
To some extent, the acceptance of the public of these low yielding securities
appears to be explained by a perception that the cheap money policy would be
kept for the foreseeable future. But also there were controls over issues by British
companies and the "virtual prohibition on the issue or purchase of foreign securities.
... In 1950 around half of all quoted securities, whether nominal, or market value,
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consisted of UK government debt."1 In addition to private demand for government
securities, there was a large demand by several government agencies and banks, such
as the Postal and Trustee Saving Banks.
Further reading: Fforde (1992), Sayers (1976)
Monetary Policy and Banking Regulation in the 1950s and 1960s
With the end of the cheap money policy in early 1950s, credit control became
an important tool for monetary policy. There were quantitative restrictions (Bank
Rate, pressure on liquidity ratios) as well as persuasion. The banking system during
this period was characterized by lack of competition, regulations on advances and
on interest-bearing deposits.
Explicit minimum liquidity ratios were placed in 1951. It was advised that
the liquidity ratio should be between 28 and 32 percent, and the minimum was 25
percent. The liquidity ratio had increased to 30 percent by 1957, and remained in
place with the exception of a small decrease to 28 percent in 1963, until 1971 when
new regulation was passed.
The "Special Deposit Scheme" was established in 1958. Commercial banks
would make deposits with the Bank of England who would then lend them to the
Treasury. Even if it was designed as an instrument of monetary policy, it was in
practice an instrument for raising forced loans by the government. These deposits
were remunerated the going Treasury bill rate, but did not qualify as liquid assets.
Competition and Credit Control of 1971
1Michie (1999), p.359
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Effective September 16th of 1971, a uniform minimum reserve ratio of 12.5
percent was imposed on banks. The eligible reserve assets were: balances with the
BoE, British government and Northern Ireland Treasury Bills, company tax reserve
certificates, money at call with the London money market, British government stocks
with one year or less to final maturity, local authority bills eligible for re-discount at
the Bank of England and (up to a maximum of 2 percent of the eligible liabilities)
commercial bills eligible for re-discount at the BoE.
Moral Suasion
Several sources cite the use of moral suasion or persuasion by the Bank of
England as a tool of monetary policy. The high degree of concentration in the
banking system and lack of competition made it possible for this to be an effective
instrument.
The informal approach to bank supervision is best exemplified by the
approach taken by Bank of England. In Britain, supervision was tradi-
tionally carried out by the Bank of England in consultation with banks.
Moral suasion, discretion, and personal contact were the principal tools
of bank supervisors. Each bank had an individual relationship with the
Bank of England. ... For many years this system worked relatively well
in a highly concentrated banking industry. However, the system came
under stress when the number of banks increased as a result of the cre-
ation of so-called secondary banks and the influx of foreign banks in the
late 1960s and early 1970s.
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Polizatto, 1990
Bank Rate and Minimum Lending Rate
Until 1971, the main policy objective had been the control over the supply of
credit available in the economy as well as the level and structure of interest rates. As
it has been mentioned before, credit restrictions were achieved through quantitative
and qualitative restrictions. The control over interest rates was achieved by the
Bank Rate, an interest rate set by the Bank of England.
The Bank Rate was the interest rate at which the central bank was willing to
lend to members of the discount market. But it was also an interest rate that served
as a reference point for rates which the London Clearing Banks paid on deposits
and charged on advances.
As a result of the reforms that took place at the end of 1971, the Bank Rate
was replaced by the Minimum Lending Rate (MLR). The rate was pegged at 1/2%
above the Treasury bills rate, rounded to the nearest 1/4% above and effective.
The system allowed though arbitrary changes. The Bank was also allowed to, in
situations in which the formula would lead to a reduction in the rate, to leave the
MLR unchanged or change it by less that what would be prescribed by the formula.
From May of 1978, the rate started to be determined by administrative decision.
Capital Controls
Initial controls had been established at the outbreak of the war in 1939. In
1946, the Exchange Control Act was passed which remained in place until 1979. The
controls restricted the funding of foreign investment except when it had a positive
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effect on the balance of payments. In addition, UK residents were not allowed to
hold foreign currency deposits or lend to overseas residents. Purchases of foreign
exchange to invest overseas could be made only from the sale of existing foreign
securities or from foreign currency borrowing. (Artis and Taylor, 1989)
A.3 Japan
The organization of the financial sector in Japan shares many characteristic to
those of Western societies, however it is characterized by an important role played
by the government. The influence of the government goes beyond the formulation of
monetary policy or the determination of interest rates, and includes the extension
of credit to certain firms or projects.
Following World War II and until 1970-1, the Japanese financial system,
and its economy in general, were characterized by strict government
control and objectives of growth and productivity through investment
and exports. ... The postwar environment was characterized chiefly by
"export/investment-led high growth," the artificially low interest rate
policy, and barriers to internationalization as well as predominance of
indirect (bank) financing
Kanovsky, 1990
The most important institution in the field of banking and credit, how-
ever, is the Ministry of Finance which shapes fiscal and monetary poli-
cies, supervises not only all credit institutions but also the financial
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behavior of all corporations, collects taxes and custom duties, controls
foreign exchange, and has a decisive voice in the approval of foreign
investment in Japan an Japanese investment overseas.
Adams and Hoshii, 1972
From its establishment the Bank of Japan was under the direction of the
Ministry of Finance (Cargill, Hutchison, and Itō, 2001). The Bank had to report
once a month to the Ministry Finance, and the government could change the By-
laws of the Bank at any point it considered relevant. In 1942, during the War,
there was a change in the Law that rendered the Bank more dependent on the
government. The important role played by the Ministry of Finance, is also evident
in the fact that since 1949 one of the members in the Board of the Bank of Japan
was a representative of the Ministry of Finance. Despite some changes, the 1942
Law remained in place until 1998.
Interest Rate Regulation
In Japan there were two types of interest rates: free or market rates and
regulated rates. Regulations on deposit rates were first introduced in 1901 by the
Osaka Bankers Association. The argument to establish interest rates ceilings was
that competition among banks to capture deposits could lead to a financial crisis.
In 1947, the Temporary Interest Rate Law was passed. The law controlled
maximum interest rates for bank deposits. In addition to aiming at a stable banking
system, the regulation was aimed at contributing to price stability by holding down
interest costs. The restrictions started to be removed in 1975.
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Interest rates on government bonds were also regulated. Suzuki (1987) de-
scribes in great detail how different interest rates were determined. He mentions
that the mechanism to set the interest rate on different types of government bonds
differed by type of bond. For instance, for long-term bonds, "the issue terms are
decided by the long-term Government bond facilitation committee (sewanin kai),
which consists of the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Japan, and representatives
of the underwriting syndicate." It turns out that de facto most of the issues are
regulated, even in the absence of a legal requirement to do so.
Capital Controls
Restrictions to cross-border transactions were established in 1932 through the
Anti-Capital Flight Laws. During the War the controls were strengthen, and re-
mained in place after its end. The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Act
was passed in 1949,which forbade in principle all cross-border transactions, unless
the Government lifted a restriction.
In this way, through the high growth period, exchange controls were
gradually eased but still remained rather restrictive, at least with respect
to financial transactions. These controls, which separated domestic and
foreign markets and regulated transactions in funds between foreign and
domestic markets, protected the various regulations and customs in the
domestic financial market, ... Thus, the regulation of foreign transactions





During the postwar a system, called Fiscal Investment and Loan Program
(FILP), was designed to transfer funds from the public to specific sectors of the econ-
omy. The system is under the direction of the Ministry of Finance which operated
through its Trust Fund Bureau. The postal savings system provides an important
share of the funds, which are then transferred to one of the ten government banks.
These banks make subsidized loans to sectors in the economy or projects that the
government considers important for the development of the country. Two of the
government banks are the Export-Import Bank of Japan which was established in
1950, and the Japan Development Bank established in 1951.
Despite other regulations in the economy, such as the ceiling on interest rates,
have been removed, the FILP remains in place in the Japanese economy. In 1999,
almost 20% of the households’ financial assets were deposited in postal savings
accounts. According to current regulations, 80% of the postal savings assets have
to be invested in government bonds.
A.4 France
France was one of the countries occupied by German forces during World
War II. During the occupation, the Germans tried to obtain as many resources as
possible from French economy, which left the country in a severe fiscal stress. The
weak state of the finances was combined by the need to rebuild the country and
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that of increasing economic growth. Policymakers at the time decided that, because
of the special situation in which the economy found itself, credit could not left to
market forces and that it was necessary for the government to take an active role in
directing credit to the sectors in the economy that needed it the most.
This goal was achieved by the establishment of what was called the circuit. In
December of 1945 three major changes to the financial system were implemented:
nationalization of the Bank of France, ownership of the four largest deposit banks2
and government officials at major commercial banks, and the creation of the Conseil
National du Crédit. The ownership of these banks made explicit the importance
that government policy would have during this period in the functioning of the
financial system. In addition, to this change in the structure of the system there
were restrictions to bank lending which will be discussed in more detail below.
The second element necessary for the functioning of the circuit was to make
sure that the government would obtain the necessary funds to carry out its pol-
icy. This was achieved through several means: portfolio requirements on banks,
restrictions on purchase of other assets besides government securities, and tax ben-
efits associated to the purchase of government securities. Finally, the circuit was
somewhat isolated from foreign markets through the presence of capital controls.
Some of the policies in place during this period were:
• Government securities floor: Banks were forced to hold a certain propor-
tion of the funds in the form of Treasury bills. These bills at the time were
2The banks were: Crédit Lyonnais, Société Générale, Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et
l’Industrie, Comptoir National d’Escompte
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issued on tap by authorities at regulated rates. "The Banks had on one hand
to keep in their portfolios a reserve of government bills equal to at least 95 per
cent of the sum held on 20 September (9 days before), and on the other hand
reemploy at least 20 per cent of the annual increase in their deposits in taking
up government bills" (Patat and Lutfalla, 1990).
• Rediscount ceilings which was intended to avoid excessive indebtedness.
The ceilings were establishment specific. Banks who needed funds above the
ceiling could often obtain them at a higher interest rate. These two rates
mechanism was nicknamed "hell" and "superhell". It was abolished in 1967
and replaced by a single penalty rate set at 2.5 points above the discount rate.
• Direct control of interest rates
– Ceilings on lending rates
– Ceilings on deposits. These were made more flexible in the mid-1960s.
– Regulations to influence long term interest rates. Bond issuances were
decided by the Treasury Directorate of the Ministère des Finances, which
also set the schedule for issuances.
• Reserve requirements
– From 1967 on there were non-interest bearing compulsory reserves against
bank deposits. It was used to control the expansion of bank credit, but
also to discourage the inflow of capital. Since May 1971, the Banque du
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France, could set the reserve ratio for franc deposit by non-residents up
to a maximum of 100 percent.
– There were also reserve requirements to credit granted by banks and
other financial institutions.There were two types of reserve requirements:
i) ordinary reserves, and ii) supplementary reserves. The former apply to
the change in the amount of credit relative to a reference date, and the
later to the total amount of credit outstanding.
• Foreign exchange controls were applied to non-franc countries. The re-
strictions included controls on direct investment, restrictions on the purchase
of foreign securities by residents, tight controls on foreign issues in the French
market, borrowing and lending abroad required case-by-case authorization.
• Directed credit. There were special institutions to channel below market
credit to housing, agriculture, exports, industrial development, and local en-
tities.
• Regulations on consumer lending. Because the government wanted to
control the allocation of credit in the economy, the conditions for consumer
lending were restrictive.
• Ceiling on bank lending Initially established in 1958, the encadrement du
crédit, limited bank lending. A bank which did not abide by the rule was
subject to a sanction which consisted of a lowering in its re-discount ceiling.
The Bank also applied selective credit control to induce banks to lend to certain
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sectors that were considered important for the economy.
• Borrowing was also encouraged by: indexation, tax exemptions, lotteries, and
forced borrowing
A.5 Italy
Similar to other countries, the Italian finances were in precarious state at the
end of the war. During the period 1945-1980 there were two moments of more
instability in the economy: at the end of WWII and in the 1970s. The government
would play an important role throughout the overall period.
At the end of the war there were several institutional changes that gave the
Bank of Italy more control over the financial system, and at the same time rendered
the Bank of Italy more dependent on the Treasury. For instance, according to the
Decree no.1 of 1945 the governor of the Bank of Italy would be appointed or removed
by the Primer Minister in consultation with the Treasury Minister. The central bank
became independent in the 1980s.
Some of the policies and regulation during the period 1945-1980 were:
• Reserve requirements It was one of the main instruments of monetary
policy. There were different reserve requirements for certain types of deposit
as well as for different types of institutions. In contrast to the situation in other
countries, reserves were remunerated in Italy, usually at the rate of discount.
Deposits by non-residents were until 1962 subject to a flat 50 percent reserve
requirement.
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• Peg of interest rates. Lasted for three years between 1966 and 1969. It was
part of the so-called "stabilization plan" of the yield curve.
• Floor prices on government securities. Since 1975, the central bank was
allowed to act as a residual buyer, and the Treasury set a minimum price for
each auction. Which resulted effectively in a ceiling on the interest rate payed
by government securities. The Bank was not allowed to finance more than 14
percent of the budget of the Treasury. In share of debt held by the Bank of
Italy went from 12 percent in 1966 to 48 percent in 1975. Floor prices on 6
and 12-month Treasury bills were eliminated in 1989, and those in medium
and long term bonds in 1992.
• Maximum deposit rates
• Portfolio requirements. As in the case of France, Italian authorities de-
signed a "circuit" to transfer funds to the government. Banks were forced to
invest a proportion of customer deposits in government securities. In 1973,
portfolio constraints (vincolo portafoglio) were re-imposed. Banks were forced
to invest 6 percent of its deposits as of December 31st 1972 in long term
government securities.
• Restriction on banks net foreign position. The government required at
times, depending on whether it wanted to prevent an inflow or outflow of cap-
itals, a positive or negative net foreign position, a ceiling on net indebtedness,
a balance position, or any net positive position. Banks were free to choose the
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gross amounts of liabilities and assets.
• Two-tier foreign exchange market: a freely quoted and an official ex-
change rate.
• Credit control. At different points in time, controls on the allocation of credit
or its growth rate were imposed. Such was the case in 1973. The controls were
made sector and even firm specific. An institution which violated the rules
was subject to a penalty which consisted of depositing in the Bank of Italy
an amount equal to the loan in excess of the ceiling in a non-interest bearing
account. The controls were still in place in early 1980s.
• Discretionary credit from central bank. The banking system did not
have direct access to central bank credit. Instead, the Bank would make a
decision case-by-case.
For more details see: OECD (1973), Frattiani and Spinelli (1997)
A.6 Australia
• LGS Convention The liquid assets and government securities (LGS) conven-
tion did not have statutory basis but, since 1956, established a minimum ratio
of its assets in notes and coins, cash with the Reserve Bank, Commonwealth
treasury bills and notes and other Commonwealth Government securities. The
ratio initially set at 14 percent, had been increased to 18 percent by 1962.
• Controls over Bank Lending. The Reserve Bank controlled through reserve
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requirements the overall amount of funds available to commercial banks, and
through other regulations its allocation. In many occasions, the Bank issues
directives for the banks and monitored their lending, even in the absence of a
legal restriction.
– Farm Development Loan Funds Designed to provide medium to long term
funds to small farmers
– Australian Resources Development Bank Limited Bank established in
1967 with capital from the major trading banks, the Reserve Bank, Bank
of New South Wales, and the Rural and Industries Banks of Western
Australia. The purpose was to direct credit towars enterprises to develop
of Australian’s natural resources
– Australian Banks’ Export Re-Finance Corporation Limited
• Control on Interest Rates The Reserve Bank has, with the approval of the
Treasury, statutory power to set limits on the interest rates paid or received




Selective controls, instruments of monetary policy that are applied to certain
sectors, were extensively used in India.
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• Margin Requirements on Security Loans
• Controls on Consumer Credit
• Moral Suasion
• Rationing of Credit
Around mid-1950s the Reserve Bank of India imposed restrictions on advances
by banks. The purpose was to limit the credit available for speculation of food
commodity prices. The Bank believed that part of the increase in the price of these
commodities was due to excessive bank credit (Mutalik-Desai and Ghonasgi,1969)
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Appendix Tables and Literature Review











Australia Before 0.43 -1.68 -1.82 -1.35 -0.78
After 7.23 3.09 4.47 4.85 6.27
Brazil Before 169.29 65.26
After 1176.44 2079.56
Canada Before 3.61 1.79 2.31
After 4.13 2.49 2.80




Egypt Before -0.53 -5.43 -1.97
After 6.53 1.13 4.20
Finland Before -0.85 1.95 -0.03
After 4.73 4.21 3.14
France Before 0.55 -2.50 0.80 2.87 0.20















Italy Before -0.41 -1.14
After 3.89 5.16
Japan Before 0.70 -2.96 0.79 -0.96
After 3.06 0.58 1.86 1.18
Korea Before 3.87 3.21 5.35 2.00
After 4.19 3.00 4.05 -0.50
Malaysia Before 2.08 -0.14 0.07 0.63
After 1.95 1.76 1.60 2.59
Mexico Before 0.05 2.40
After 0.21 5.15
New Zealand Before -1.03 -2.08 0.31
After 8.96 5.30 5.42
Philippines Before -0.54 -3.34
After 1.81 2.00
South Africa Before 1.67 -2.08 -2.31 -1.45
After 6.46 2.67 2.35 3.17
Sweden Before 2.65 0.33 0.13 -0.30 1.02
After 6.31 1.61 4.36 3.16 1.74
Thailand Before 7.81 4.59 5.52 4.90
After 6.14 2.58 2.42 3.37
Turkey Before -9.47 12.75
After -3.11 6.62
United Kingdom Before -1.36 -2.31 -5.98 -0.52
After 4.37 3.21 3.91 3.66
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United States Before 2.47 1.31 0.69 0.97
After 4.93 2.32 1.89 1.71
Venezuela Before -2.30 1.65 -7.94
After -6.03 -0.30 10.22
Table A.2 sketches the approach, sample and findings of six papers that have in
different ways attempted to quantify some of the dimensions of financial repression.
While Beim and Calomiris (2001) primarily aim to rank a cross section of countries
at a point (or two) in time to link the measures’ extent of financial repression to
growth and development, the remaining papers do attempt to quantify some of
the financial repression "revenue" equivalents. For instance, the papers dealing
with reserve requirements capture the tax on financial institutions. Ultimately (as
Reinhart and Reinhart, 1999 document) the banks pass this tax on to depositors (via
lower deposit rates), non-government borrowers (via higher lending rates) or both,
depending who has the most access to alternatives. If households are barred from
holding foreign assets and/or gold (see Table 2), lower deposits rates are tolerated
more readily. If domestic banks are the only game in town for the firms, they will
have to live with the higher lending rates.
The Giovannini and deMelo (1993) paper is closest in spirit to our fundamen-
tal two-part intertwined question (i) what is the annual saving on interest payments
domestic on debt? and (ii) what is the magnitude of the erosion or liquidation
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Table B.2: Measuring "Taxes" from Financial Repression: Selected Papers
Study Measure(s) of finan-
cial repression










of seignorage is ac-










the highest share of
seignorage accounted
for by reserve ratios is
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For the emerging
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coverage is for 1997.
The annual indices
are reported for 1970
and for 1990 for a
subset of countries.
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in the chronic high
inflation countries
of Africa and Latin
America.
Easterly (1989) Net domestic trans-
fers from the finan-
cial system and tax
on financial intermedi-
ation. Uses inflation-
adjusted flow of funds
analysis to calculate
the size of the trans-









for Mexico and Yu-
goslavia among the 12
countries, reaching 12-
16 percent of GDP in
some years.
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Study Measure(s) of finan-
cial repression
Sample and coverage Highlight of findings
Easterly and Schmitt-
Hebbel (1994)
















are for less than half
of the countries)
This component of the
financial repression
tax is in the order of




rate on external (do-
mestic) debt are cal-
culated as the ratio
of external (domestic)
interest payments to
the stock of exter-
nal (domestic) debt.
The government rev-
enue from financial re-
pression is calculated
by computing the dif-
ferential between the
foreign borrowing cost
and the domestic bor-














are estimated from a
low of 0.5 percent of
GDP for Zaire (with
its small domestic
debt market to a high
of about 6 percent for
Mexico. Estimates for
Greece and Portugal
are 2-2.5 percent of
GDP.
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on the existing stock of debt due to negative real interest rates? Giovannini and
de Melo (1993) compare "effective interest rates" on external debt to the poten-
tially repressed "effective interest rates on domestic debt" (See Table A1.2). This
is a natural exercise for emerging markets (the focus of their analysis) for the pe-
riod that they consider (1974-1987), as emerging market governments were funding
themselves through both domestic and external borrowing (in varying degrees), as
documented by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). The market-determined interest rate
on external debt is a logical benchmark under such circumstances. However, there
are two compelling reasons why this approach is neither feasible nor desirable for
our purposes. First, some countries (like the United States and the Netherlands)
do not have and have not had historically external debt. All government debts are
issued under domestic law and in the domestic currency, irrespective of whether the
holders of the debt are domestic pension funds or foreign central banks. Second,
most emerging markets had little or no external debt during the heyday of the finan-
cial repression era during Bretton Woods (1945-1973); the depression of the 1930s
and the subsequent world war had all but eradicated global debt markets.
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Appendix C
Data Appendix and Glossary
The data appendix describes the sources and variables used throughout the
paper. Except for electronic databases all the data used is in the public domain and
comes primarily from official publications. The glossary contains the definition of
important terms, not common in the literature, used throughout the paper.
C.1 Glossary
• Government Domestic Debt All debt liabilities of a government that are
issued under and subject to national jurisdiction, regardless of the nationality
of the creditor or the currency of denomination of the debt (Reinhart and
Rogoff, 2009). Historically most of the domestic debt has been denominated
in local currency. Notable exceptions are Mexican Tesobonos in the 1980’s
and Brazil dollar-denominated bonds a decade after.
• Liquidation Year Years when the real interest rate on the portfolio of do-
mestic government securities is negative.
• Moral SuasionMoral "suasion" refers to the use of the influence of the central
bank upon commercial banks to follow its suggestions and recommendations,
such as in exercising credit restraint or diverting loans to specified sectors of
the economy. Such suggestions do not possess the force of law, though the
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threat of converting suggestions into legal orders, if necessary, often backs
such suggestions (Handa, 2000).
C.2 Variable Definition
Panel Data
• Central Bank Independence: Cukierman index, weighting as suggested in the
book.
• Deficit-to-GDP: difference between total revenues and total spending divided
by GDP.
• Interest Payments-to-GDP: (weigthed) average nominal interest rate times
stock of debt and divided by GDP. Series for interest rate constructed by the
author.
Stock Market Index used to calculate total return
• Australia: ASX
• Japan: Nikko
• Belgium: Brussels All-Share Return Index
• South Africa: Johannesburg
• France: CAC All-Tradable Total Return Index
• Sweden: Affarsvarlden Return Index
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• Ireland: ISEQ
• United Kingdom FTSE All-Share Return Index
• Italy: BCI
• United States: S&P 500 Total Return Index.
C.3 Data Sources
Common sources
• Global Financial Data: Consumer Price Index, Gross Domestic Product, Stock
Market Total Return.
• International Financial Statistics: Gross Domestic Product, Fiscal Accounts
• Mitchell: Gross Domestic Product, Fiscal Accounts
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Table C.1: Country Specific Data Sources
Country Sample Source Data Description
Period
Argentina 1942-1980 Ministerio de Hacienda Detailed Debt Data. Tax Revenues
Banco Central de la
República Argentina
Detailed debt data, prices of govern-
ment bonds.
Ferreres, Orlando (2004) Tax Revenues, M1
Australia 1945-1980 Bureau of Census and
Statistics
Detailed Debt Data, tax revenues
The Parliament of the Com-
monwealth of Australia
Detailed Debt Data
Reserve Bank of Australia M1
Belgium 1945-1974 Banque Nationale de Bel-
gique
Detailed Debt Data, prices of gov-
ernment bonds, tax revenues, M1
France 1945-1980 Ministere des Finances Detailed Debt Data
Metzler, Allan (1959) and
GFD
M1
India 1949-1980 Reserve Bank of India Detailed debt data, bond prices, M1
and tax revenues.
Ireland 1960-1990 Department of Finance Detailed debt data
Central Statistics Office Detailed Debt Data. Tax Revenues
Central Bank of Ireland M1
Italy 1945-1980 Istituto Centrale di Statis-
tica
Detailed Debt Data






Japan 1945-2008 Okurasho Detailed Debt Data
Statistics Bureau Japan Tax Revenues, M1
South Africa 1945-1980 Control and Audit Office Detailed debt data and tax revenues.




Sweden 1945-1980 Riksgäldskontoret Detailed Debt Data




United Kingdom 1945-1980 Bank of England Detailed debt data, price of govern-
ment securities, M1
Central Statistical Office Detailed debt data. Tax Revenues
United States 1945-1980 Department of Treasury Detailed debt data, tax revenues
CRSP database Price of government securities
Friedman and Schwartz M1
Federal Reserve Board M1
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Composition of Debt Portfolios for India and the US
Table C.2: India: Composition of Domestic Debt (as percentage of total domestic debt)
1950 1960 1970
Marketable Rupee Loans 59 48 39
Treasury Bills 15 25 21
Small Savings 17 17 19
Other Obligations 9 10 21
Table C.3: US: Composition of Domestic Debt (as percentage of total domestic debt)
1946 1956 1966 1976
Interest bearing obligations
Marketable obligations 67.3 58 65.8 64.5
Treasury Bills 6.5 9.1 20.3 25.1
Certificates of Indebtedness 11.4 6.9
Treasury Notes 3.8 12.8 17.8 33.2
Treasury Bonds 45.5 29.2 27.7 6.2
Other Bonds 0.1 0
Non-marketable obligations 22.7 24.7 16.7 35.4
Special Issues 9.4 16.5 16.6
Matured debt on which interest has ceased 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1
Debt bearing no interest 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.1
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